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THE MARKET VALUE CONTROVERSY:
EXXON CORP. v. MIDDLETON
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the dawning of the energy crisis, t producers of natural gas
sold in interstate and intrastate commerce2 have been called on with
increased frequency to defend themselves against royalty owners alleg-
ing payment of insufficient royalties.' Generally, a royalty is a pay-
ment made to a royalty owner by a producer of oil and gas under the
terms set forth by the gas royalty clause within an oil and gas lease. A
royalty compensates the royalty owner for relinquishing the right to the
oil and gas by entitling him to a share of production.4 The market
value controversy is attributable to the confusion stemming from gas
royalty clauses which provide two standards of royalty computation.
Royalties may be computed on the basis of the prevailing market value
of natural gas sold or computed on the basis of the sales price, or pro-
ceeds, of natural gas sold.' Market value controversy cases involve dis-
putes concerning producers who have customarily paid royalties
computed on a proceeds basis, or on another standard which is less
than market value, regardless of the terms of a controlling gas royalty
clause.6 In 1968, in Texas Oil& Gas Corp. v. Vela,7 the Texas Supreme
1. See notes 20-22 infra and accompanying text.
2. Eg., Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1262 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving natu-
ral gas sold in interstate commerce under a certificate of convenience and necessity from the
FERC); Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410,412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ ref. n.r.e.) (involv-
ing natural gas sold solely in unregulated interstate commerce).
3. E.g., Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571
S.W.2d 349 (rex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'dinpart, No. B-7979 (Tex. Oct. 1, 1980), vacated on rehear-
ing, rev'din part, No. B-7979 (rex. Feb. 4, 1981), Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d
829 (rex. Civ. App. 1978, writ ref. n.r.e.); Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977, writ ref n.r.e.).
4. 3 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 38.1 (12th rev. ed. 1967).
5. A gas royalty clause may provide for a fixed royalty payment, id. § 40.2, or for the deliv-
ery of gas in kind. Id. § 40.3. It is more common, however, for the gas royalty clause to provide
for royalties computed from the value of the gas produced or for royalties to be computed from
the sales price of the gas. These two common royalty provisions are often combined. The result is
that the royalty will be based upon market value of the gas sold off the premises if there are no
sales at the well. Moreover, the result of such a combination is that the royalty will be based upon
the sales price, or proceeds, if there are sales at the well, or on the premises. Id. § 40.4. See note
68 infra and accompanying text for an example of such a combination of gas royalty provisions.
6. Throughout the history of the industry a 'custom and usage' had developed under
which the royalty owners were compensated by payment of a designated percentage of
1
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Court decided that royalty payments would be computed from the pre-
vailing market value of those natural gas sales which were comparable
to the particular gas sale which was the subject of the market value
controversy in Vela.8 Suing for the difference between royalties com-
puted from the prevailing market value, or market value royalties, and
royalties computed from the sales price, or proceeds royalties, is not the
only recourse a royalty owner has against a producer.9 However, it has
been the royalty owners' most popular response to the Vela decision.
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton,l° presented the supreme court with an-
other opportunity to consider the market value controversy. I Among
its pronouncements,' 2 the supreme court in Middleton held that the
the 'proceeds' of the sale of gas. . . .This so-called 'custom and usage' largely ignored
the exact language of the oil and gas leases and their gas royalty provisions.
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 353 (rex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd in part, No. B-7979
(Tex. Oct. 1, 1980), vacated on rehearing, rev'd in part, No. B-7979 ('ex. Feb. 4, 1981).
7. 429 S.W.2d 866 (rex. 1968). See note 55 infra and accompanying text.
8. Id. at 872-74.
9. Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979, writ
pending) (where lessee under a proceeds royalty provision sold gas under a long-term contract,
which contained a sales price at approximately one-half of the market value but no price re-
determination clause, there was a breach of the implied covenant to market).
10. 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd in part, No. B-7979 (Tex. Oct. 1, 1980) va-
cated on rehearing, rev'd in part, No. B-7979 (rex. Feb. 4, 1981).
11. Other avenues of recourse are limited in Texas by a four-year statute of limitation. TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980). See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co.,
626 F.2d 1261, 1262 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex.
1968).
12. The court came to a different conclusion than the civil appeals court and trial court con-
cerning the contractual validity of division orders executed by a producer. Generally, a division
order sets forth the interest of each royalty owner for the purposes of payment by the producer.
E.g., Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ ref. n.r.e.). As con-
cerns the market value controversy, a gas division order between the royalty owner and the produ-
cer may affect the gas royalty clause of a lease in two ways. First, the division order may relieve
the lessee of his obligations under the royalty clause. Second, where the division order differs
from the royalty clause concerning the measurement of quantity, quality, price, or value of the
production, the royalty clause is modified by the terms of the division order. H. WILLIAMS, OIL
AND GAS LAW § 705 (7th ed. 1980). Gas division orders are not normally revocable since the
economics of the gas industry dictate that the purchaser of gas must often incur substantial ex-
penditures in the gathering and processing of gas. Id. § 704.4. In Middleton, the trial court had
held that the producer's division orders were binding until revoked by the royalty owners through
the service of petitions concerning Middleton's market value controversy case. No. B-7979, slip
op. at 19 (rex., Feb. 4, 1981). The civil appeals court expanded the trial court holding by conclud-
ing that the producer's division orders were revoked by service of the pleadings where a statutory
presumption of consideration required that the division orders, as contractual obligations, were
unilaterally irrevocable. .d. at 20. The supreme court reversed both lower courts in holding that
the division orders did not amend the controlling gas royalty clause language. No. B-7979 (Tex.,
Oct. 1, 1980). This holding was vacated on rehearing. The supreme court subsequently followed
its earlier decision in Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 293 S.W.2d 844, 847 (rex. 1956) (division order
binding until unilaterally revoked), by holding that the royalty payments made and accepted
under the producer's division orders were binding until the unilateral revocation of the division
orders by the service of petitions of the royalty owners. No. B-7979, slip op. at 20 (rex., Feb. 4,
2
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word "sold" within a gas royalty clause referred to the sale of gas at the
time gas was delivered under a long-term gas contract, and not at the
time the long-term gas contract was executed. 3 The court also held
that gas is sold "at the well" only when gas is delivered inside the
boundary lines of the leased premises. 4 As in Vela, the supreme court
in Middleton implemented a theoretical free market value definition
with a test requiring sales comparable in time, quality and availability
to marketing outlets for the purpose of computing market value during
the intrastate gas sale in question. Middleton's treatment of the compa-
rability test significantly amplified the Vela test though. In addition,
the supreme court in Middleton agreed with the rule in Vela, which
rejected the averaging of all gas prices for gas sold in the field of pro-
duction, for the reason that such gas was designated for sale in both
intrastate and interstate markets and was found to be "conceptually
and legally different."' 5 Notably, the supreme court in Middleton did
not examine the effect the National Gas Policy Act of 1978 might have
on the market value controversy issue. The Act was passed after the
commencement of litigation in Middleton, but well before its ultimate
disposition, in an effort to mitigate inflationary forces which exacer-
bated the market value controversy. 16 The purpose of this casenote is
to examine the effect of Middleton as it pertains to the major issues
involved in the market value controversy. Specifically, the issues ad-
dressed are: (1) whether gas is "sold" at the time of delivery or at the
execution of the contract; (2) whether gas sold "at the well" is deter-
mined by the boundaries of the leased premises or the field of produc-
1981); J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 110 (5th Cir. 1966) (royalty payments in ac-
cordance with precise and definite division orders are binding until withdrawn); Pan American
Petro Corp. v. Long, 340 F.2d 212, 223 (5th Cir. 1964) (language of division order binding,
whether or not a contract, until revoked); Phillips Petro. Co. v. Williams, 158 F.2d 723, 727 (5th
Cir. 1946) (royalty payments accepted under a division order are binding until revoked). The
supreme court held that, although damages were established at a definite time, prejudgment inter-
est was not recoverable by the royalty owners because the amount of damages was not definitely
determinable due to the mathematical uncertainty of determining the market value of the gas in
question before the supreme court's determination of the market value. No. B-7979, slip op. at 21
(Tex., Feb. 4, 1981) Black Lake Pipeline Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 95-96 (Tex.
1976) (contractors, in suit against pipeline company, unable to recover prejudgment interest on
extra work performed). The supreme court held that a unitization agreement did not obliterate
the lease lines for the purpose of royalty payment. No. B-7979, slip op. at 22-23 (Tex., Feb. 4,
1981).
13. See notes 180 & 182 infra and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. See notes 184-191, infra and accompanying text.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3311-3320, 3331-3333, 3341-3348, 3361-3375, 3391-3394, 3411-3428,
3431-3432 (Supp. III 1979).
[Vol. 16:550
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tion; (3) what constitutes a comparable sale for the purpose of
determining the definition of market value; and (4) what effect the
NGA has on the market value controversy.
II. THE LAW PRIOR TO THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
Exxow CoR. v MIDDLETON
A. The Historical Basis
Until the 1930's, natural gas had very little economic value to oil
and gas producers. As a result, natural gas was often flared as a waste
product." Though natural gas eventually became too valuable to
waste, the association of the product with low economic returns contin-
ued to be reflected in the payment of proceeds royalties by the produ-
cers to the royalty owners. This method of royalty computation
continued into the energy crisis of the early 1970's. Printed oil and gas
leases, drafted by producers, often contained gas royalty clauses which
obligated the producers to pay either market value royalties or pro-
ceeds royalties depending upon the point of delivery to a gas purchaser.
Professor Eugene Kuntz has cited an example of such a market value-
proceeds royalty clause. The clause states that: "the royalties to be
paid the lessor are. . . on gas the market value at the well of 1/8 of the
gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells, the royalty
shall be 1/8 of the amount realized from such sale. . . ." 1 Producers
were aware that market value royalties were computed from the pre-
vailing market value of gas sold.' 9 However, it was the customary
practice of the producer to compensate royalty owners with proceeds
royalties no matter where the gas was delivered. Until the energy crisis,
royalty owners quietly acquiesced to this method of computation, since,
as a practical matter there was almost no difference between a market
value or proceeds standard. 0 Proceeds royalties were generally com-
puted on the basis of the sales price received by producers under long-
17. In the early days of the oil industry in [Texas], natural gas was regarded more as a
waste by-product of oil production than as a valuable resource. The gas produced along
with oil was often simply burned or 'flared.'. .. From the air, West Texas was said to
look as if campfires of all of all [sic] of the armies in the history of the world were
burning below.
571 S.W.2d at 352.
18. 3 E. KUNTZ, supra note 4, § 40.4.
19. Eg., Phillips Petro. Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1946); Ladd v. Upham, 58
S.W.2d 1037, 1039 (rex. Civ. App. 1933), aft'd, 95 S.W.2d 365, 366 (rex. 1936); Walker, The
Nature of the Property Interests Created By an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 10 TEx. L. REV.
291,310 (1932).
20. See note 22 infra.
1981]
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term gas contracts. Producers found it necessary to enter long-term
contracts in order to meet inherent financing, construction, and opera-
tional costs of producing natural gas.2 ' The depletion of energy re-
sources made royalty owners aware that they could receive a greater
share of production if the producers paid market value royalties instead
of the customary proceeds royalties. 22 Until the spiraling market in-
creases, market value royalties were not insisted upon since price ad-
justment mechanisms built into the long-term gas contracts were
generally sufficient to keep the sales price received by the producers in
line with any increase in the market value of natural gas sold.23
Implicit in the passage of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) was
the recognition that natural gas could in fact become a valuable com-
modity.24 The NGA was enacted by Congress to protect consumers of
interstate gas from exploitive natural gas companies. 25 This change in
attitude occurred in the 1930's when various communities began to use
substantial quantities of natural gas as a heating fuel. The change be-
came more evident in the 1940's with the building of an interstate pipe-
line system for use in the war effort. This system provided the basis of
today's large and complex interstate pipeline system.26 Furthermore,
the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Phillos Petroleum Co. v. Wiscon-
21. The reasons for these long-term contracts were at least two-fold. Firstly, a substan-
tial financial commitment was involved in bringing a pipeline to the producing wells and
thence to the user. This cdst was coupled with the investment required for dehydration
and compression, if necessary to meet pipeline standards. Moreover, plants often
stripped the liquid hydrocarbons from the gas to yield a valuable by-product. Naturally,
one would not expect to invest in and provide such physical facilities at great expense
only to have the supply of gas diverted to a new purchaser. Secondly, gas had to be used
as produced until relatively recently. The manufacture and storage of liquified natural
gas, and the use of some "storage" capacity in spent reservoirs have had little effect on
the fact that gas is normally used as quickly as it is produced. These two economic facts
of life led to the almost universal use of long-term gas purchase contracts.
571 S.W.2d at 352. Irrevocable dedication of gas sold in interstate commerce provided a third
reason for long-term gas contracts. See California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519, 521-22
(1978). See note 130 infra and accompanying text.
22. E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978, writpend-
Lvg) "Until 1972, the price of natural gas made no dramatic increase and was sold by lessees on
long term. . . contracts. In 1972, its price began a rapid escalation from about 20t per . . . [Mcfl
to over $2.00 per Mcf by the third quarter of 1975". Id. at 831.
23. See Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 488-89 (5th Cir. 1964) (escalation clause in
a gas purchase contract would have assured the lessees of royalties computed from the market
price from the years 1958 to 1962); Butler v. Exxon Corp,, 559 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977, writ ref n.r.e.) (one cent price escalation clause failed to keep up with inflation rate).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
25. When Congress enacted the NGA it was primarily motivated by a desire "to protect
consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies." Sunray Oil Co. v. FPC,
364 U.S. 137, 147 (1960) (quoting FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944)).
26. 571 S.W.2d at 352-53.
5
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sin27 held that a gas producer came within the NGA definition of a
"natural-gas company. ' 28 The Supreme Court ruling firmly estab-
lished that it was unlawful for producers and gas purchasers to contract
for a gas sales price higher than a just and reasonable price. Under the
NGA, gas sold in interstate commerce had to be irrevocably committed
to the interstate market under a certificate of public convenience and
necessity.29 The Federal Power Commission (FPC) set ceiling rates in
accordance with the requirements of the NGA in order to enforce the
just and reasonable prices mandated by that congressional act.30 As a
result of the energy crisis, intrastate gas, which was not irrevocably
committed to the interstate market, began to increase rapidly in market
value since it was unfettered by FPC regulations.31 However, as early
as the 1960's, the disparity between royalty computations based on the
market value of natural gas and the royalty computations based on the
proceeds value under long-term contracts became painfully evident to
royalty owners of gas irrevocably committed to interstate commerce.
Two Fifth Circuit cases, Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas
Co. 32 and J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman,33 resulted from the disparity
evidenced in the 1960's between market value and proceeds. In Wey-
mouth and Huber, producers of gas which was irrevocably committed
to interstate commerce had compensated royalty owners on a proceeds
royalties basis. The gas prices were stipulated by long-term contracts
and limited by the FPC ceiling rate.34 Accordingly, proceeds royalties
27. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
28. Id. at 684 (a petroleum company which neither engaged in the interstate transmission of
gas, nor affiliated with an interstate pipeline company, nonetheless sold gas to interstate pipeline
company and was held to be a "natural-gas company"). See 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1976).
29. See California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519, 523-24 (1978); 15 U.S.C.
§ 717F(b) (1976).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1976); see United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381
U.S. 392 (1965) "A regulatory statute such as the Natural Gas Act would be hamstrung if it were
tied down to technical concepts of local law." Id. at 400.
3 1. As evidenced by the following statutory language, intrastate gas pricing was not limited
under the Natural Gas Act.
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in inter-
state commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate
public consumption.... and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or
sale, but shall not apply to any other tansportation or sale of natural gas or to the local
distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the produc-
tion or gathering of natural gas.
15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976), quoted in Phillips Petro. Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 676 (1954).
32. 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966).
33. 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966).
34. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 108-09 (5th Cir. 1966); Weymouth v. Colo-
rado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 90 (5th Cir. 1966).
1981]
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were computed on the basis of that rate. In an effort to avoid paying
higher market value royalties demanded by the royalty owners, the
producers in Huber argued that the market value of natural gas was
intended, by the parties to the controlling lease, to be the proceeds as
computed under a long-term contract.15 The Fifth Circuit in Huber
rejected this argument in the following language:
We do not minimize the beguiling appeal of the lessee-Produ-
cer's theory. Without a doubt, with the Lessor's full approval,
this committed until the exhaustion of the reserves all of the
gas to this contract and hence to this "market." But the "mar-
ket" as the descriptive of the buyer or the outlet for the sale is
not synonomous with its larger meaning in fixing price or
value. For in that situation the law looks not to the particular
transaction but the theoretical one between the supposed free
seller vis-a-vis the contemporary free buyer dealing freely at
arm's length supposedly in relation to property which neither
will ever own, buy or sell. It was not, as this theory would
make it read, an agreement to pay 1/4th of the price received
from the market on which this gas is sold. Rather, it was to
pay 1/4 of the "market price" or "market value" as the case
might be.36
However, the Weymouth court rejected the royalty owners' argument
that a theoretical free market value should be used in computing mar-
ket value royalties in a regulated market system. The court in Wey-
mouth concluded:
The law must take account of the fallout of Phillis [Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsinj. That means that while the inquiry might
be: what would a willing seller and buyer pay?, the circum-
stances of that fictional negotiation must reckon with the na-
ture of this business. It is no sense a "free" market. The usual
"free, willing" negotiations contemplate a contract binding on
each and enforceable as the bargain made. But this is only
partially true for gas sales [in interstate commerce]. . . . So
this "free," "willing" buyer is not so "free." Nor is his coun-
terpart, the seller. Nor the commodity. Nor is the business.
Nor is the sale. The test in capsulated form is then, what
would a willing seller and a willing buyer in a business which
subjects them and the commodity to restriction and regula-
tion, including a committment for a long period of time, agree
35. 367 F.2d at 109.
36. Id. at 109-10 & n.14 (footnotes omitted) (citing Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas
Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966)).
[Vol. 16:550
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to take and pay with a reasonable expectation that the FPC
would approve the price [and price changes] and other terms
and then issue the necessary certificate of public convenience
and necessity.3
7
The court in Huber appeared to associate the meaning of market value
with a theoretical free market. Huber examined the parties intent at
the execution of the controlling lease. The court in Weymouth, though,
defined the market value on the basis of gas sold in interstate com-
merce in consideration of the nature of the business.
Uncertain in Huber as to any FPC regulatory power over royalties
computed from the FPC ceiling rate, the court did not conclusively de-
termine the market value of the interstate gas sales in question. In-
stead, the Fifth Circuit referred the issue to the FPC.38 The FPC held
that oil and gas royalty provisions constituted sales of gas for resale in
interstate commerce subject to FPC regulation under the NGA.39 The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the FPC's
holding in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,4° concluding that royalty owners
did not come within the definition of a "natural-gas company" under
the NGA.4 1 Therefore, the royalties received by a royalty owner could
not be subject to FPC regulation. However, the court in Mobil Oil also
commented:
[W]e can certainly visualize the possibility that a court con-
fronted with a contention of entitlement to a market price ba-
sis higher than the producer's ceiling would consider it to run
counter to the intention of the parties, unless there is some-
thing to rebut thefairpresumption that they contemplated in-
terstate movement and market prices compatible therewith.42
The disparity between market value royalties and proceeds royalties
was evident not only to royalty owners of gas sold in interstate com-
merce, but to royalty owners of gas sold in intrastate commerce as well.
37. 367 F.2d at 89, 90. Royalty owners alleged insufficiencies in royalties due under a market
value royalty provision on gas sold in the FPC regulated interstate market. Royalty owners spe-
cifically argued that transactions by other interstate pipeline companies were not the result of
arm's length transactions and were therefore incomparable to the interstate gas sales in question
for determining market value. Id. at 86-88 (footnote omitted).
38. 367 F.2d at 121.
39. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 256, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1971). "[Tlhe royalty payment
provisions of oil and gas leases constitute a sale for resale of natural gas in interstate commerce
subject to regulation under the Natural Gas Act." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing 42 FPC REP. 164,
174).
40. 463 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
41. Id. at 259.
42. Id. at 265 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Permian Basin Area Rates Cases,
390 U.S. 747, 793 (1968)).
19811
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Regarding the intrastate market, the problem is not as significant
though. It arises not through market limitations, but through the fail-
ure of price adjustment mechanisms to keep pace with the current mar-
ket rate. In this context, Texas Oiland Gas Corp. v. Vela43 was decided.
B. The Case Law
In Vela, the royalty owners alleged a deficiency in gas royalty pay-
ments. The deficiency was alleged on the basis of the difference be-
tween royalty amounts, for which the express wording of the gas
royalty clause provided, and the proceeds royalty amounts the produ-
cers actually paid.4" The 1933 oil and gas lease in Vela contained a
"market price" gas royalty provision which obligated the producer to
"pay the lessor, as royalty for gas from each well where gas only is
found, while the same is being sold or used off of the premises, one-
eighth of the market price at the wells of the amount so sold or used."'4 -
The producers also entered into several long-term gas contracts in the
mid-1930's which provided a contract sales price from which the pro-
ceeds royalties were computed. The natural gas was sold only in intra-
state commerce.46 The supreme court rejected the producer's argument
that the gas was "sold" for the contract sales prices at the time the long-
term gas contacts were executed and not at the time of delivery to any
later gas purchaser for "market price.147 The supreme court stated:
It is clear then that the parties knew how to and did provide
for royalties. . . , based upon market price or market value,
and based upon the proceeds derived by the lessee from the
sale of gas. They might have agreed that the royalty on gas
produced from a gas well would be a fractional part of the
amount realized by the lessee from its sale. Instead of doing
so, however, they stipulated in plain terms that the lessee
would pay one-eighth of the market price at the well of all gas
sold or used off the premises. This clearly means the prevail-
ing market price at the time of the sale or use. The gas which
43. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
44. Id. at 868.
45. Id. Generally, "market price" is synonymous with "market value." See J.M. Huber
Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 107 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1966); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan.
448, 562 P.2d 1, 5 (1977); Butler v. Exxon corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 417 n.2 (rex. Civ. App. 1977, writ
ref n.r.e.). But see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Coffee, 140 F.2d 409, 410-11 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (market price not necessarily the same as market value).
46. 429 S.W.2d at 870. The supreme court did permit the indirect consideration of some FPC
regulated gas prices in determining market value. Id. at 872.
47. Id. at 871.
[Vol. 16:550
9
Holcombe: The Market Value Controversy: Exxon Corp. v. Middleton
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
EXXON CORP. v. MIDDLETON
was marketed under the long-term contracts in this case was
not "being sold" at the time the contracts were made but at
the time of the delivery to the purchaser.48
However, relying on Foster v. Atlantic Rfning Co. , the supreme court
agreed with the civil appeals court in Vela that "the contract price for
which the gas was sold by the lessee is not necessarily the market price
within the meaning of the lease."50 The supreme court strictly con-
strued the "market price" gas royalty provision against the drafting
party.
The contestants in Vela agreed with the position that sales of gas
which are "comparable in time, quality and availability to marketing
outlets" should determine "market price."' I The supreme court agreed
with the civil appeals court's statement "that the mathematical average
of all [gas] prices paid in the field is not a final answer to the difficult
problem of determining market price at any particular time."52 How-
ever, the supreme court rejected an argument by the producers that the
"market price" of the royalty owner's expert witness was the mathemat-
ical average of noncomparable gas sales prices. Applying the compara-
bility test agreed on by the contestants, it appears the supreme court
found it persuasive that the royalty owner's expert witness had consid-
ered only intrastate gas sales comparable to the gas sales in question.
Furthermore, the supreme court found it significant that objections to
the basis of an expert's testimony went only to its weight and not its
legitimacy.53 The supreme court affirmed both lower courts by stating
that the averaging of comparable sales for the time period involved
would be the prevailing market price during the gas sale in question.
54
48. Id.
The obligation of [the producer] to pay royalties is fixed and unambiguous. It made the
gas sales contract with full knowledge of this obligation and did nothing to protect itself
against increases in price. The fact that its purchaser would not agree to pay the market
price prevailing at the time of delivery does not destroy the lease obligation ....
When it made the gas sales contract, [the producer] took the calculated risk of that
contract producing royalties satisfactory to the lease terms. The fact that increases in
market prices have made the lease obligations financially burdensome is no defense.
Id. (quoting Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1964)).
49. 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
50. 429 S.W.2d at 871.
51. Id. at 872 ("The question is . . .whether. . . there have been recent, substantial, and
comparable sales of like gas. . . from wells in the area whose availability for marketing is reason-
ably or substantially similar to.. .the gas here involved.") (citing Phillips Petro. Co. v. Bynum,
155 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 677 (1946)).
52. 429 S.W.2d at 873.
53. Id. at 872.
54. "If the rate of production were constant, that figure would be the average market price
for the period." Id. at 873.
1981]
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The supreme court held that a "market price" royalty provision in a gas
royalty clause of an oil and gas lease entitled the royalty owner to mar-
ket value royalties, which were computed from the average of all sales
prices of gas within a field of production which were comparable to the
gas sales in question." In addition, the term "sold" within the same
royalty provision, referred to the time of each gas delivery made by a
producer under a long-term gas contract and not the time at which the
contract was executed. The dissenting judges in Vela emphasized that
the parties to the oil and gas lease had intended, at the execution of the
long-term gas contract, that the contract price be the market value. The
dissent also emphasized that while the lease in Foster expressly obli-
gated the producer to pay royalties computed from the market price
"when [the gas is] run," the Vela lease contained no such express obli-
gation. 6 The dissent did agree though, with the application of Vela's
55. Butsee Pierce v. Texas Pac. Oil Co., 547 F.2d 519, 521-22 (10th Cir. 1976) (contract price
equals market price); Apache Gas Prods. Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 509 P.2d 109, 112-13
(Okla. 1973) (gas contract price equals market price unless market price is less than contract price
at the execution of contract).
56. Four judges dissented in Vela. The dissent agreed with the majority opinion that the
sales price in a gas contract was not necessarily the market value of comparable gas sales during
the gas sales in question. However, the dissent disagreed with the majority's holding concerning
when gas is sold.
The royalty to be paid for gas presents a most difficult problem because of the nature of
the gas sales, and has been the subject of much litigation. The Courts have recognized,
and the undisputed evidence in this case confirms, that the practicalities of the gas indus-
try require that gas be sold under long-term contracts because the pipelines must have a
committed source of supply sufficient to justify financing, construction and operation.
Therefore, the rules of daily sales and daily quotations have no application.
429 S.W.2d at 878-79 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68,
73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)). The "practicalities of the gas industry require that gas be sold under
long-term contracts because the pipelines must have a committed source of supply sufficient to
justify financing, construction, and operation." Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d at 488 (citing
Gex v. Texas Co., 337 S.W.2d 820, 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960, no writ) (footnote omitted)). Conse-
quently, believing that the parties at the execution of the oil and gas lease had intended gas to be
"sold" at the execution of a long-term gas contract, the dissent stated:
[W]hen the parties entered into the least contract they all knew that the term "market
price" necessarily meant the price prevailing for gas on long-term contract as of the time
the sale contract should be made. They knew it could only be sold at a price to be fixed
in the contract for gas to be delivered in the future.
429 S.W.2d at 879 (dissenting opinion) (dissent considered gas to be sold at execution of control-
ling long term contract).
The dissent emphasized that the phrase "when run" in the Foster lease distinguished Foster
from the Vela case. In Foster, the relevant part of the royalty clause read:
The conventional royalties to be paid by Lessee are: (a) On oil and gas, . . . one-eighth
of that produced and saved from said land, the same to be delivered to the credit for
the Lessor into the pipe line and to be sold at the market price therefore prev aiingfor the
field where produced when run ....
329 F.2d at 488 (emphasis added). The producer paid royalties computed from the proceeds of
gas sales under a long-term gas contract. The purchaser would not agree to pay the prevailing
market price. The royalty owners argued that they were entitled to the difference between market
11
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comparability test.57
With the disparity between the interstate gas market and the intra-
state market exacerbated by the energy crisis, the Supreme Court of
Kansas decided Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp.5 8 Unlike Vela, where nat-
ural gas was only sold in intrastate commerce, in Lightcap the produ-
cers had dedicated their entire natural gas production to the interstate
market system under long-term contracts. These long-term contracts
called for a "fair, just and reasonable price" to be re-established peri-
odically. 9 Pursuant to the long-term contracts, a rate increase was es-
tablished by arbitration but only part of the arbitrated rate increase was
approved by the FPC. The royalty owners contended that the arbi-
trated price was the market value of natural gas sold, as determined by
a theoretical free market value. However, the producers argued that
because the natural gas was sold in interstate commerce under the gas
purchase contracts, that royalties should be computed from the contract
sale prices or the FPC ceiling rate.60 The court in Lightcap, however,
read J.M Huber Corp. v. Denman to stand for the proposition "that a
'market value' lease on its face calls for payment at the theoretical free
market value.",6 ' Agreeing with the royalty owners, the court con-
cluded that the producers were analyzing the problem backwards 62 and
held "that the existence of federal regulation over the rates which a gas
producer may receive is no obstacle to the fixing of a higher rate as the
price royalties and proceeds royalties over a four-year period. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the
royalty owners in holding that the express terms of the lease required the producer to pay market
price royalties instead of proceeds royalties. Id. The dissent in Vela construed the royalty clause
in Foster and stated:
It will be noted under the royalty provision the [producer] did not even have authority to
sell [the royalty owner's] one-eighth. . . interest in the gas until it had been delivered to
the credit of the [royalty owner] in the pipeline. The parties in effect contracted against
long-term gas sales contracts. We have no such limitation in the lease [in Vela] ...
Under the terms of the [Vela] lease the [royalty owner] owns all the gas, and it was
contemplated by the parties that it would be sold in the usual and customary manner,
that is, under long-term contracts.
429 S.W.2d at 880 (dissenting opinion).
57. 429 S.W.2d at 878 (dissenting opinion) (citing Phillips Petro. Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196,
210 (5th Cir. 1946)).
58. 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1 (1977).
59. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 4.
60. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 5.
61. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 6. It was in reference to the language in Huber, that the supreme
court in Lighicap made this statement. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
62. mhe process begins at the other end. The royalties to be paid are first to be deter-
mined under state law, based on the terms of the lease. The royalties so determined then
becomes a component cost, to be considered by the FPC in determining the rates it will
permit [the producer] to charge.
221 Kan. at -, 562 P.2d at 8.
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"market value" of the gas it sells for the purpose of computing royal-
ties."63 Thus, while the price may be suppressed for marketing pur-
poses, it does not necessarily follow that the price must also be
suppressed for royalty computation purposes according to Lig'hcap.
Like V'ela, the royalty owners in Lightcap were entitled to market value
royalties. However, as a dissenting opinion in Ligh/cap noted, "[t]he
majority opinion completely disregards the question of what evidence
may be necessary to establish a 'market price.' ""
Soon after the decision by the Kansas Supreme Court in Lighkap,
the Texas Civil Appeals Court decided several important cases.6" The
first decision, Butler v. Exxon Corp. ,66 concerned a market value con-
troversy over royalties computed from the sale of intrastate gas. The
situation was similar to the one in Vela.6 7 The controlling gas royalty
clause provided that royalties "on gas, . . . sold or used off the prem-
ises . . . , [shall be] the market value at the well of one-eighth of the
gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty
shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale."'6 8 The nat-
ural gas was delivered to the purchaser approximately one hundred feet
off of the leased premises.69 The civil appeals court found it persuasive
that, within the gas royalty clause, the language "at the well" was not
limited by any language which required the sale of natural gas to be on
the leased premises.7° Citing the federal district court decision of
63. Id.
64. 221 Kan. at -, 562 P.2d at 30. Nonetheless, the ruling in Lightcap was favorably cited by
the Montana Supreme Court in Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978).
Though the gas sales in question were only intrastate sales, the supreme court in Montana Power
stated that:
The existence of federal regulation over the rates which a gas producer may receive is no
obstacle to the fixing of a higher rate as the market value of the gas it sells for the
purpose of computing [royalties] ....
[Furthermore,] under the type of market price lease here, even an FPC regulated gas
company would have to pay royalties based on actual market price of gas, regardless of
FPC regulations.
586 P.2d at 301-02 (relying on Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, -, 562 P.2d 1, 11 (1977)
(dictum)).
65. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 574 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rey'd in part, No. B-
7979 (Tex. Oct. 1, 1980), vacatedon rehearing, rey'dinpart, No. B-7979 (Tex. Feb. 4, 1981); Exxon
Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978, writ ref. n.r.e. ); Butler v. Exxon
Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ ref n.r.e.).
66. 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ ref n.r.e.).
67. Id. at 412.
68. Id.
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Skaggs v. Heard,7 where a sale was on the leased premises but over
three hundred feet from the well, the civil appeals court affirmed the
trial court's holding that a sale may occur "at the well" where the gas is
delivered in the vicinity of the field of production in which the royalty
owner's wells are located.72 The civil appeals court summarily adopted
Vela's conclusion that market value means the prevailing market value
at the time of sale, or delivery, to the gas purchaser.73 The civil appeals
court also noted the fact that the producer had not offered testimony to
rebut the royalty owners' expert testimony to the effect that tri-monthly
averaging of the three highest prices in the field of production was de-
terminative of the prevailing market value.74 This was consistent with
Vela's comparability test which determined the market value of gas
sold during the time period in question. Butler expressly disapproved
of the trial court's decision that market value should be determined by
a volume-weighted average of all gas sold in interstate and intrastate
commerce from that market area." On remand to the trial court, the
civil appeals court stated that "an actual market in the field [of produc-
tion] will be practically conclusive evidence of [market] value."76 Find-
ing no reversible error, the Texas Supreme Court refused review.7 7
In the subsequent civil appeals court decision of Exxon Corp. v.
71. 172 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (gas sale within the boundaries of the leased
premises, but 320 feet from the nearest well-head, is sold "at the well").
72. 559 S.W.2d at 416.
73. "Believing that the Vela case controls as to this lease provision, we held that market value
means the prevailing market value at the time of the sale and sale occurs at the time of delivery to
the purchaser." Id. The dissent in Butler disagreed with the result in Vela and stated:
The majority in Fela fails to recognize that the market, in the case of natural gas, is not a
market of spot sales or deliveries, but of long term contracts made at the given point in
time. The minority opinion, recognizing this, is entitled to close attention in any jurisdic-
tion not committed by precedent to the result reached by the majority in ,e a.
Id. at 419 (dissenting opinion) (quoting 3A W. SUMMER, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 589 (2d ed.
1958)). The dissent in Butler further stated:
[Professor W.L. Summers] is ... of the opinion that such gas royalty clauses are fraught
with ambiguity and that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the lessee as a
matter of law. This, because of the fact that gas can only be sold and must be sold by
long term contracts as to which prices are almost certain to get out of line with contem-
porary prices, plus the implied. . . obligation of the lessee to market the gas with dis-
patch.
559 S.W.2d at 419 (dissenting opinion). The dissent in Butler disagreed with the majority in But-
ler as to the ruling in Fela that gas is "sold" when delivered.
74. 559 S.W.2d at 417.
75. Id. at 415, 417. The majority opinion in Butler did not define a volume-weighted aver-
age. For the definition provided in the supreme court decision in Middleton see note 163 infra.
76. Id. at 417 n.2.
77. Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ ref. nr.e.).
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Middleton,78 the royalty owners alleged insufficient royalty payments
for gas sold during the early 1970's. The controlling gas royalty clause,
which was contained in oil and gas leases executed from 1933 to 1944,
provided that royalties "on gas. . . sold or used off the premises...
[shall be] the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold
or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalties shall be
one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale. . . ."9 The natural
gas was sold in an intrastate marketing system owned by the producer,
Exxon Corporation (Exxon). The gas was delivered by Exxon's gas
plant, which was not located on the premises. Depending upon which
long-term gas contract the gas was sold under, royalties were computed
from Exxon's "field price" and on a proceeds basis."0 The civil appeals
court in Middleton first considered when gas is "sold." Exxon argued
that natural gas could not be "sold" on a daily basis. This was contrary
to the trial courts ruling which construed the sale of gas term in the
lease as pertaining to the time of gas delivery under a long-term con-
tract. Exxon argued that the trial courts perception of the problem was
erroneous since the gas could only be "sold" pursuant to long-term
contracts which contained built-in price adjustment mechanisms 8'
Moreover, Exxon argued that the parties intended at the execution of
the controlling lease that gas not be sold on a daily basis. Citing Foster
v. Atlantic Refining Co. ,2 the civil appeals court recognized the inevita-
ble fact that natural gas had to be committed under long-term sales
contracts. However, the civil appeals court upheld the trial court in
stating that "just as gas was being 'sold'" in Vela when it was deliver to
purchasers, so was gas . . . 'sold' when it was delivered by Exxon
78. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd in part, No. B-
7979 (Tex. Oct. 1, 1980), vacated on rehearing, rev'd in part, No. B-7979 (Tex. Feb. 4, 1981).
79. 571 S.W.2d at 356.
80. Id. at 355-56.
In order to compute its field price, Exxon reviews Purchaser's Monthly Gas Reports
(PMG Reports) filed by twenty-six major pipeline purchasers in a marketing area con-
sisting of Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) District 3 and seven adjoining counties,
Exxon divides the total price reported as paid for one month in each quarter of the year
for the gas currently delivered to those major purchasers in the marketing area by the
total volume of the gas delivered. The quotient, according to Exxon, is the volume
weighted average price for most of the gas sold in the marketing area approximately two
to three months before the time for which Exxon is attempting to set its field price. From
that volume weighted average price, Exxon makes projections of what the current vol-
ume weighted price is. The projected current volume weighted price is Exxon's field
price.
Id. at 356.
81. Id. at 356-57.
82. 329 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 16:550
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"83
Pursuant to determining when gas is "sold," the civil appeals court
in Middleton contradicted Butler as to when gas is sold "at the well."
The trial court held that gas delivered at Exxon's gas plant was sold "at
the well." The civil appeals court in Middleton found it persuasive that
Exxon's gas plant was not located on the premises of the royalty own-
er's leases. The civil appeals court reversed the trial court by conclud-
ing that gas delivered off the premises was not gas sold "at the wells."8 4
The Middleton court also attempted to determine the prevailing
market value during the gas sale in question. The comparability test
stated in Vela was applied to determine if the trial court had been cor-
rect in accepting the testimony of the royalty owners' expert witness' as
to the method for determining the prevailing market value.85 Vela's
comparability test was utilized as a limiting device in examining
whether the expert had considered only comparable sales in determin-
ing prevailing market value.86 Middleton considered the expert's mar-
keting area from which comparable sales had been drawn. The civil
appeals court reversed the trial court ruling that the field of production
was the marketing area from which comparable sales would be drawn
for determining the prevailing market value. The trial court had
83. "The supreme court's construction of the words 'being sold' in Vela is controlling in this
case." 571 S.W.2d at 357.
84. "The court's finding that the gas was sold at the [glas [p]lant is inconsistent with, and
better supported by the evidence than, the finding that the gas was 'sold at the wells."' Id. at 365.
85. "All parties agree that comparable sales of gas are those comparable in time, quantity,
quality, and availability of marketing outlets." Id. at 359 (citing Phillips Petro. Co. v. Bynum, 155
F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1946)).
86. 571 S.W.2d at 358-62. The civil appeals court gave the royalty owners' expert's testimony
as follows:
[The expert] did not limit his consideration of sales to the [gas] field. He took as the
comparable marketing area for his calculation TRC Districts 2, 3 and 4. These districts
comprise a very large part of the gas-producing area of South Texas ... . He obtained
PMG Reports from the State Controller's Office. He reviewed more than 30,000 gas
sales transactions that were described in the reports in order to determine prices paid for
gas in each transaction. He calculated the market value of gas produced from the [roy-
alty owners'] leases during 1973, 1974 and 1975 by averaging the three highestprices paid
per million b.t.u.'s of gas in TRC Districts 2, 3 and 4 during the first month of each
quarter of those years. [The expert] did not consider in his calculations any sales in
which the seller was a transmission company or an affiliate of the purchaser, nor did he
consider any sales if the same or similar purchase price did not appear in the PMG
Reports for Districts 2, 3 and 4 in the following quarter.
Id. at 357-58 (emphasis in original). The Texas Railroad Commission has divided the state of
Texas into twelve districts for the purpose of administering oil and gas regulations. The trial court
accepted the area encompassed by TRC districts 2, 3, and 4 as the marketing area from which
comparable sales would be drawn. These three TRC districts completely border the Texas Gulf
Coast. See 4 RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION: OIL AND GAS
A-I (1980).
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agreed with the expert's definition of the marketing area from which
comparable sales were drawn as three Texas Railroad Commission
(TRC) districts outside the field of production. The trial court had also
considered the expert's tri-monthly price data drawn from the three
TRC districts. It was held by the civil appeals court that monthly price
data drawn from the field of production was more consistent with a
time period, as here, involving a rapid escalation of the intrastate mar-
ket value of gas sold. Ultimately, the civil appeals court reversed the
trial court after finding that the gas sales which the royalty owners'
expert considered were in conflict with the civil appeals court's inter-
pretation of Vela's comparability test.8 7
The Middleton court considered the testimony proffered by the
royalty owners concerning the mathematical computation of compara-
ble sales within the three TRC districts. Middleton interpreted Vela to
require mathematical averaging of all prices paid in a marketing area
and to also require corroboration of this average with comparable
sales. The civil appeals court concluded that the expert witness had
averaged the three highest prices paid in the three TRC districts. Con-
sequently, the civil appeals court overruled the trial court, deciding that
87. In determining the market price of gas, we conclude from the supreme court's hold-
ing in Yela that: (1) the relevant marketing area is the field in which the gas was pro-
duced; (2) the market price of gas is to be determined by reference to sales of gas
comparable in time, quality and availability to marketing outlets; (3) the mathematical
average of all prices paid in the field is not a final answer to determining market value
price at any particular time; (4) the relevant period of time to be used in determining the
amount that should have been paid to the royalty owners in the specific period in ques-
tion; and (5) an expert's opinion based upon a mathematical average of prices paid in the
field and corroborated by comparable sales from the field during the relevant period may
afford a basis for determining market price.
We hold that the method adopted in this case does not meet the requirements out-
lined by the supreme court in Yela. [The royalty owners' expert] did not define the
relevant market area as the. . . [flield [of production]. He refused to give weight to any
contracts for sale of gas from this field. The sales that he considered were not shown to
be comparable in time, quality and availability to marketing outlets. He selected only
the highest prices paid in TRC Districts 2, 3 and 4 that satisfied his criteria. He made no
mathematical average of all prices paid in the field, nor did he seek to corroborate such
an average with comparable sales as defined by the supreme court. His consideration of
price data compiled on a quarterly, rather than monthly, basis is inconsistent with the
time period at issue in the case.
571 S.W.2d at 362. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. The civil appeals court in Middle-
ton noted:
We do not believe that the Texas Courts will apply the principles of Vela to federally
controlled or regulated interstate gas, since there can be no "market value" or "market
price" in a price-regulated environment, although we recognize that the supreme court
did permit the consideration in Yela of the price of regulated gas sold [in determining
market value].
Id. at 362 n.3. The civil appeals court in Middleton, in dictum, limited the comparability test in
Yela to market value controversy cases involving only unregulated intrastate gas sales.
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only an averaging of all monthly intrastate gas prices drawn from the
field of production would be the market value.8 8 Middleton also con-
sidered Exxon's "field price." The court found that since "field price"
was partially computed from interstate gas sales and was also lower
than the prevailing market value of gas sold in intrastate commerce,
interstate gas sales were not comparable to intrastate gas sales and
therefore royalties computed from Exxon's "field price," like proceeds
royalties, were not market value royalties and, therefore, did not com-
pensate the royalty owners for their share of production.89
Immediately after the decision in Middleton, the civil appeals
court, in Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., Inc. ,9 was confronted with
a similar issue involving intrastate gas sales. The controlling royalty
clause stated that "royalties shall be the market value at the well of
one-eighth of the gas so sold or used."91 Unlike the court in Middleton,
the court in Jefferson accepted tri-monthly price data as comparable for
the purpose of determining the prevailing market value. Like Middle-
ton though, the Jefferson court held, in effect, that an average of all gas
prices in the marketing area would determine the prevailing market
value for the gas sale in question. But the court in Jefferson considered
the inclusion of long-term gas contract prices entered into before the
energy crisis. Exxon argued that its natural gas was committed to a gas
system so that Exxon could meet its long-term gas contracts. There-
fore, Exxon argued, prices in long-term gas contracts executed before
the energy crisis should be included in an average of all prices in the
market area. However, the civil appeals court disagreed on the basis
that this gas was not committed to any specific customer, as the gas in
question had been committed. The civil appeals court in Jefferson held
that gas prices on long-term gas contracts entered into before the "en-
ergy crisis" would be excluded because such prices would have de-
pressed the prevailing market value for the gas sale in question.
92
Finding no reversible error, the Texas Supreme Court refused review.
93
Prior to the Middleton decision, a similar controversy, also
88. Id. at 362. See note 87 supra.
89. Id. at 362-63.
90. 573 S.W.2d 829 (rex. Civ. App. 1978, writ pending).
91. Id. at 830.
92. [We. . .hold. . . that Exxon's weighted average market price for all gas sold by
all producers in the particular area is the proper method of determining the market value
of the gas produced after January 1, 1973, provided such weighted average does not
include the price paid for any gas sold under contract entered into prior to said date.
573 S.W.2d at 831 (emphasis added).
93. Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 $.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978, writ granted).
198 1
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originating in Texas, was decided by a federal district court in Brent v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. ofAmerica.94 In Brent, the parties stipulated
that the controlling leases, executed in the 1920's, required royalties to
be "the market value at the well of one-eighth. . . of the gas produced,
...saved, and sold or used off the leased premises." 95 The federal
district court was faced with the problem of determining the market
value of natural gas which had been irrevocably committed to inter-
state commerce. Although noting that the supreme court in Vela had
not dealt with gas irrevocably committed to the interstate market, the
court in Brent accepted Vela's comparability test for the purpose of
implementing a regulated market value definition for determining mar-
ket value. This regulated market value definition was set forth by the
Fifth Circuit in Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.96 The federal
district court considered the experts' opinions for both parties in rela-
tion to Weymouth's regulated market value definition. The court in
Brent considered that there were two distinct markets for natural gas,
an intrastate market and an interstate market, and that the only price
available for determining market value of gas irrevocably committed to
interstate commerce was the established FPC area rate. The federal
district court also considered the testimony of the royalty owners' ex-
pert witnesses who examined sales of intrastate and interstate gas in
determining the market value for the gas in question. The royalty own-
ers argued that the expert opinions met Vela's comparability test. The
royalty owners also argued that the expert opinions met Weymouth's
regulated market value definition because the parties to the pertinent
long-term contracts considered the FPC regulation in determining a
contract price. Therefore, the royalty owners asserted, the intent of the
parties was that market value be derived from both intrastate and inter-
state gas sales prices. The federal district court clearly rejected this ar-
gument because unregulated sales prices of intrastate gas were used in
computing the market value for the interstate gas sale in question.97
94. 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex. 1978), a~f'dsub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626
F.2d 1261, 1262 (5th Cir. 1980).
95. 457 F. Supp. at 158.
96. 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966).
97. 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966). 'rent stated that "considering FPC regulations of interstate
gas, that under the facts of the instant case only sales of interstate gas are comparable to determine
the 'market value' of the gas in question, and that sales of intrastate gas are not comparable to
make such a determination." 457 F. Supp. at 160 (relying on Hemus v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861
(S.D. Tex. 1978)).
The opinions given by [the royalty owner's] expert witnesses must be rejected for two
reasons. First, said opinions take into consideration both sales of intrastate and inter-
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The court found that the testimony of the producers' expert witness met
Weymouth's regulated market value definition.98 Notably though, the
opinion of a second producers' expert was rejected by the court because
it called for a volume-weighted average of all interstate and intrastate
gas sales prices within a geographical area.99 The federal court in
Brent held that "the 'market value' of the gas here in question, based
on comparable sales here in the interstate market, is the FPC ceiling
rate." ' 00 The court emphasized, however, that the practical effect of its
holding required market value to be equated with proceeds or the FPC
ceiling rate.' The federal court followed and extended an earlier rul-
ing in Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins °2 in which the federal district court
determined market value in the regulated interstate gas market by
analogy to the determination of market value in eminent domain litiga-
state gas in determining "market value." Secondly, it was shown that many of the inter-
state gas sales contracts examined and considered by (the royalty owner's) witnesses
reflected prices which were short term or emergency sales prices, small producer prices,
prices allowed for newly discovered gas and prices which were rolled back to the FPC
rate.
In conclusion the court finds that there are two distinct markets for gas in the geo-
graphical area where defendant's wells are located, the interstate market and the intra-
state market. The gas in this case has been irrevocably dedicated to the former.
Therefore, only interstate gas sales in the relevant geographical area, made by producers
of the same classification as the defendant and involving gas of the same vintage as the
gas in question, are comparable to determine the "market value" of the gas involved in
this case.
457 F. Supp. at 160, 162.
98. "In view of this conclusion the court finds that the [producer's expert] first opinion of
'market value' is the only opinion which meets both the Weymouth and Vela standards, and there-
fore, is the opinion which correctly states the 'market value' of the gas at issued." Id. at 160.
99. The "second opinion [of the producer's expert is] based upon the volume weighted aver-
age formula must also be rejected because it is founded upon consideration of both intrastate and
interstate sales, and upon contracts which were entered into many years before the periods in
question in this case." Id. at 160-61.
100. [The court concludes that the market value of the gas here in question is for the
relevant period, the stipulated FPC area rates ....
This conclusion is mandated by the test set forth in Weymouth. .. and is supported
by the Hemus case. . . which is directly in point. Additionally, this result is not pre-
cluded by the decisions in Vela ...[or] JM. Huber Corp .....
Id. at 161.
101. This court is not holding that the defendant must pay royalties based solely on the
price it receives for the gas, rather the holding is that the "market value" of the gas here
in question, based on comparable sales in the interstate market, is the FPC area rate.
The court recognizes that in reality the result may be the same, that is, what the [produ-
cer] receives for its gas will likely be what the "market value" or FPC area rate is, but
this result stems from the fact that the only comparable sales of gas are those made in the
interstate market and not from the proposition that [the producer] need only pay royalty
based on what it receives.
Id.
102. 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Brent was consolidated with the
factually similar case of.Kingery v. Continental Oil Co."° The control-
ling gas royalty clause provided that the royalties "on gas. . . sold or
used off the premises. . .[shall be] the market value at the well of one-
eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells
the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such
sale."105 The gas was delivered at a point over three miles from the
leased premises pursuant to a long-term gas contract entered into in
1949. The district court had merely concluded that because the gas was
delivered off the premises then market value royalties were due the roy-
alty owners. 106 This conclusion was not appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
The court had determined the prevailing market value of the interstate
gas solely on intrastate sales of comparable gas in the "immediate
area." Before the court of appeals, the royalty owners argued that the
prevailing market value should be determined from all interstate and
intrastate sales of comparable gas in the geographical area from the
time period in question. This approach, the royalty owners argued, re-
flected the theoretical free market standard for determining the prevail-
ing market value. The producers argued that only interstate sales
prices should be considered for determining the market value because
the natural gas was irrevocably committed to interstate commerce. The
Fifth Circuit invoked Weymouth's regulated market value definition in
103. mhe key issue in most controversies relating to the "market value" of real property
is: What are the comparable sales? Comparability can be determined only by evidence
as to the "highest and best use." Decisions as to the "highest and best use" frequently
must depend upon the decisions of regulatory bodies. ... The undersigned, after con-
sideration of the authorities in this field, simply cannot conclude that there is any compa-
rability between a sale in the intrastate market and a sale in the regulated interestate
market. The gas here in question is committed to the interstate market. The key to this
Court's decision is that sales in the intrastate market are simply not comparable, and
expert testimony predicated entirely upon such sales in not a reliable basis for decision.
Before the development of the dramatic disparity between the prices paid in the
intrastate market versus the interstate market, the weighted average price method un-
doubtedly had much validity. . . . mhis was. . .[the] basic method employed. . . in
the Vela case. With the development, however, of an enormous disparity between the
intrastate market price and the interstate market price, the weighted average method
would seem to have no validity. The undersigned concludes that interstate prices are
simply not comparable to intrastate prices. The interstate market is not comparable to
the intrastate market. Averaging prices which are not comparable, therefore, is not a
valid method of determining market value.
Id. at 864-65, 866.
104. 434 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 626 F.2d 1261, 1262 (5th Cir. 1980).
105. Id. at 352.
106. Id. at 352-53.
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accepting the producer's argument. In distinguishing Vela,107 which
only considered intrastate gas sales, the court of appeals cited Hemus &
Co. v. Hawkins 08 which stated:
We are of the opinion that where the gas has been irrevocably
dedicated to the interstate market, it follows inexorably that
the only comparable sales to be used in determining the mar-
ket value of such gas are sales on the interstate market. It
likewise follows that sales on the intrastate market are not
comparable in determining the market value of such gas.10 9
Responding to the royalty owners' argument that J.f. Huber Corp. v.
Denman precluded this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit stated:
Huber is not inconsistent with the results we reach in the pres-
ent cases because we do not hold that the sales price of the gas
in question automatically determines its market value; instead
we hold only that the market value of interstate gas is to be
determined by comparison with the sales of comparable gas
on the interstate market. This is so because this gas could not
be sold on the intrastate market and thus its value on the mar-
ket was zero. Since sellers and buyers of gas in interstate
commerce cannot lawfully contract for a price above that al-
lowed by federal regulation, prices above that figure are sim-
ply not comparable." '
Finally, the royalty owners argued that the leases in question were exe-
cuted before the passage of the NGA and the decision in Phillps Petro-
leum Co. v. Wisconsin."2 Therefore, the royalty owners asserted,
because the parties under the leases never contemplated that the
amount of royalties would later be affected by federal regulation, the
obligations under the leases could not be changed. Responding to this
argument, the Fifth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court in California v.
Southland Royalty Co." 3 in which it was stated that "[h]aving author-
ized [the producer] to make interstate sales of gas [the royalty owners]
could not have expected those sales to be free from the rules and re-
strictions that from time to time would cover the interstate market."
' 14
107. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980). Kingery favorably
quoted the language from Middleton.
108. 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978). See notes 101 & 102 supra.
109. 626 F.2d at 1264 (citing Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978)).
110. 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966).
111. 626 F.2d at 1265 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
112. 347 U.S. 672 (1954). 626 F.2d at 1265. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
113. 436 U.S. 519 (1978).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Kingery and affirmed
Brent as to the district court dispositions in the consolidated decision of
Kingery v. Continental Oil Co."'
Shortly before the decision in Kingery, a federal district court, in
Domatti v. Exxon Corp. ,116 also commented on the market value con-
troversy. In Domatti, natural gas was irrevocably committed to the
federally regulated interstate commerce. The royalty owner sought
market value royalties." 7 The producer, Exxon, paid proceeds royal-
ties based on the maximum sales price allowed by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) I8 pursuant to a long-term gas con-
tract. Exxon asserted, in its motion for summary judgment, that the
FERC ceiling rate was the prevailing market value of the royalty own-
er's gas." 9 Specifically, Exxon argued that the "fair presumption"
statement in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC was applicable to the present facts
because the lease in question was executed years after Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Wisconsin.2 Exxon also posited the rule in Brent which
stated that intrastate sales of gas are not comparable to interstate gas
sales in question in a market value controversy. 12 ' The royalty owner
argued that the FERC ceiling rate regarding the price of the gas was
irrelevant to a determination of the prevailing market value royalties.
Moreover, the royalty owner argued, only unregulated intrastate gas
prices could be used in determining the prevailing market value for gas
irrevocably committed to interstate commerce. Specifically, the royalty
owner argued that Huber was distinguishable from Weymouth because
Huber established that a market value lease requires, on its face, that
market value royalties be determined from a price based upon a theo-
retical free market.' 22 The federal court in Domatti replied:
115. 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
116. 494 F. Supp. 306 (W.D. La. 1980).
117. Two gas royalty clauses covering different leased premises of the royalty owner con-
trolled. One clause was a market value royalty clause. The other was a market value-proceeds
royalty clause. Id. at 307.
The royalty owner's case was "based upon the contention that rates determined by the (Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission) for interstate gas are 'foreign, irrelevant and immaterial' to
a determination of the market value of the gas and that reference to the value of unregulated
intrastate gas is required." Id.
118. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
119. 494 F. Supp. at 307.
120. 347 U.S. 672 (1954). 494 F. Supp. at 307-08.
121. Besides Brent, Exxon also cited and relied on Weymouth and Hemus. 494 F. Supp. at
308-09. Responding to Exxon's reliance on these cases, the court in Domatli favorably quoted
language from Weymouth. See p. 556 supra.
122. The royalty owners also argued that Sartor v. United Gas Public Service Co., 84 F.2d 436
(5th Cir. 1936), Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296
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[The royalty owner] attempts to distinguish Weymouth and
the test announced therein from Huber, but we do not believe
that the cases announce different rules that require distinc-
tion. . . . [I]t seems to us that what Huber says is that the
parties in that case intended market value to mean value of
the gas on the market; Weymouth simply defines what the
market is. 123
Consistent with the conclusion in Lightca, 124 the royalty owner argued
that a market value lease requires express inclusion of market value
royalty language. The Domatti court rejected this argument.
The royalty owner in Domatti argued that the 1979 Supreme
Court decision in FERC v. Pennzoil Producing Co. 125 provided author-
ity for denying Exxon summary judgment. In Pennzoil, the Supreme
Court made a decision relevant to the market value controversy when it
commented on the relationship between royalties paid on interstate and
intrastate gas sales. The Court pointed out that the NGA did not deny
FERC the authority to give rate relief to interstate producers where
escalating costs were based upon an unregulated market price.'2 6 The
Court then held that FERC was free to grant relief only in those situa-
tions where a producer's "out of pocket expenses in connection with the
operation of a particular well exceeds its revenue from the well under
the applicable area price."'127 The royalty owner in Domati argued that
U.S. 656 (1936), Sartor v. United Gas Public Service Co., 173 So. 103 (La. 1937), Sartor v. United
Carbon Co., 163 So. 103 (La. 1935), Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co., 152 So. 561 (La.
1934), required the court in Domatti to reject Exxon's motion for summary judgment because gas
sales which were comparable to the gas sales in question could only be referred to when there was
no evidence as to a theoretical free market value. The court in Domatti responded:
[Vile do not think that these old cases address the issues presented in this case. For one
thing, all of these cases are pre-Phillps [Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin]. There was no such
thing as regulated, interstate gas at the time these cases were decided. Secondly, these
cases were decided at a time when gas was often considered as a waste product, before
the extensive use of pipelines for gas transmission. Thus, the practical nature of the gas
business compels the conclusion that we need not be automatically bound by these cases.
494 F. Supp. at 310 (footnote omitted). Accord, Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367
F.2d 84, 91 n.26 (5th Cir. 1966).
123. 494 F. Supp. at 311. The court in Domatti made this statement in reference to the lan-
guage in Huber appearing at p. 556 supra.
124. 494 F. Supp. at 310. For the rationale which the royalty owner presented, see note 61
supra and accompanying text.
125. 439 U.S. 508 (1979). In FERC v. Pennzoil, the producer and gas purchaser appealed an
FERC ruling that royalty costs could not be passed on to the consuming public if the royalties
were not solely calculated on a just and reasonable rate. The producer and gas purchaser had,
prior to the FERC ruling, agreed to increase royalty payments above the royalty payments then
being computed from the FERC ceiling rate in an effort to meet the standards of controlling
market value royalty clauses.
126. 439 U.S. at 516.
127. ld. at 517.
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because Exxon equated the market value with the FERC ceiling rate
then Pennzoil must be ignored because the Court had left open the pos-
sibility that the market value might be higher than the FERC ceiling
rate. The federal district court in Domatti noted though, that the Court
had never reached the question of market value determination in
Pennzoil.128 Furthermore, the court in Domati emphasized that "just
because the FERC has power to grant relief based upon market value
leases does not mean . . . that . . market value is not to be deter-
mined by reference to interstate-regulated gas or that market value is
more than the price received for regulated gas." 12 9
The royalty owner in Domatti relied principally on Vela and
Lightcap in attempting to prevent summary judgment for Exxon. The
federal district court in Domatti distinguished Vela on factual basis.
Specifically, the court alluded to the Vela dissenters' conclusion that
the parties in Vela had intended that the price of the contract be the
market value at the time of executing the long term gas contract.' 30 In
addition, Domatti emphasized, as the Vela dissenters had, that Foster v.
Atlantic Refining Co. 131 involved a royalty provision which expressly
obligated the producer to pay royalties "when [the gas is] run."'32 The
court in Domalti also disagreed with the Vela decision insofar as it only
considered the market value of intrastate gas.' 33 However, the court
did find merit in the use of Vela's comparability test for the purpose of
determining market value. 134 The court in Domatti also rejected the
royalty owner's reliance on Lightcap because, as a dissenter stated in
Lightcap, "[tihe majority opinion completely disregards the question of
128. The market value issue was not addressed since a determination of market value was
comprised when the producer and gas purchaser agreed on a rate higher than the FPC ceiling rate.
494 F. Supp. 311.
129. All that the courts have been saying is that there is a distinction, theoretically, be-
tween FERC rates and market value; the elements constituting each are different. The
cases hold that the FERC has no authority to fix royalty payments based upon market
value; they do not hold that FERC rates are irrelevant in establishing market value.
494 F. Supp. at 312.
130. 494 F. Supp. at 312. See notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text.
131. 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1946), distinguirhed in Domatti v. Exxon Corp., 494 F. Supp. at
312.
132. 494 F. Supp. at 312 & n.6. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
133. "We disagree with Vela for another reason. The case simply does not address the prob-
lem of how the market value of interstate gas is to be determined." 494 F. Supp. at 312.
134. "Vela is not however without some merit. The [supreme] court [in Vela] did recognize
that it is necessary in determining market value to examine 'sales of gas comparable in time,
quality and availability to marketing outlets."' 494 F. Supp. at 313.
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what evidence may be necessary to establish a 'market price.' "135 The
court in Domatti applied Vela's comparability test, and also relied on
Brent, in concluding that intrastate sales were not comparable for the
purpose of determining the market value of gas irrevocably committed
to interstate commerce. 136 However, like Brent and Kingery, the court
in Domatti stated:
We do not hold that the price received under the [purchaser's]
contract is the market value of the gas because it was the price
received; we hold that the price received is the market value
because it is the only price that reflects the market value of
[the royalty owner's] interstate gas. 137
Following the reasoning in Brent, the court in Domatti granted Exxon's
motion for summary judgment. 38
C. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
In the fall of 1978, Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act
(NGPA). 139 The NGPA ended the dual market system first established
by the NGA and later reinforced by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wiscon-
sin, and placed all gas sales under the regulation of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), n ° successor to the FPC. In the place
of the dual market system a national market system was substituted
with multiple pricing levels. 141 With certain exceptions, the NGPA did
not dramatically change the interstate pricing scheme pursuant to the
NGA. t42 However, the NGPA spoke directly to intrastate gas sales
under both existing contracts143 and new intrastate contracts entered
135. 494 F. Supp. at 313 (quoting Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Co., 221 Kan. 448, -, 562 P.2d 1, 30
(1977)). See notes 65-77 supra and accompanying text.
136. 494 F. Supp. at 314. Note 97 supra and accompanying text.
137. 494 F. Supp. at 314.
138. "[F]ollowing the reasoning of the courts in Brent and Hemus, we hold that intrastate sales
are not comparable for determining the market value of the [royalty owner's] gas. [Exxon's] mo-
tion for summary judgment is granted." 494 F. Supp. at 314.
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311-3320, 3331-3333, 3341-3348, 3361-3375, 3391-3394, 3411-3418, 343 1-
3432 (Supp. III 1979).
140. In 1977, the FPC was abolished and its powers were transferred to the FERC under the
Department of Energy Organization Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171, 7172, 7293 (Supp. I 1978).
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3319 (Supp. III 1979).
142. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314-3315(a) (Supp. III 1979) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 717(c)-717(d)
(1976).
For an analysis and overview of the NGPA, see Moody & Garten, The Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978: Analysis and Overview, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 2-1 (1979).
143. The term "existing contract" means "any contract for the first sale of ntaural [sic] gas in
effect on November 8, 1978." 15 U.S.C. § 3301(13) (Supp. III 1979). The NGPA places intrastate
contracts which come under the definition of an existing contract under a ceiling price. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3315(a)-3315(c) (Supp. III 1979).
1981]
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into after the enactment of the NGPA. " Significantly, the legal differ-
ences between interstate gas and intrastate gas, as established by the
NGA, 45 were nullified until 1985. In that year, gas which formerly
made up the intrastate market will largely be deregulated and once
again a dual market system will exist.
146
III. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
EXXON CoRP. v MIDDLETON
A. Facts and Proceedings
In the Texas Supreme Court case of Exxon Corp. v. Middlelon, 47
the royalty owners to certain natural gas leases, executed during the
years of 1933 through 1941, brought lawsuits alleging that insufficient
royalties were paid by the producer, Exxon.'48 The natural gas was
only sold in intrastate commerce under long-term gas contracts. 49
Royalties were computed on a "field price" basis. Exxon claimed that
this "field price" was equivalent to the market value of gas sold in the
intrastate market. 5 ° Within the controlling gas royalty clauses the
market value provision provided that "on gas. . . sold or used off the
premises. . . [royalties shall be] the market value at the well of one-
eighth of the gas so sold or used . . . ."I" The proceeds provision
provided "that on gas sold at the wells the royalties shall be one-eighth
144. New intrastate contracts comes under the definition of "roll-over contracts" which are
defined as follows:
[A]ny contract, entered into on or after November 9, 1978, for the first sale of natural gas
that was previously subject to an existing contract which expired at the end of a fixed
term [not including any extension thereof taking effect on or after November 9, 1978]
specified by the provisions of such existing contract, as such contract was in effect on
November 9, 1978, whether or not there is an identity of parties or terms with those of
such existing contract [is a rollover contract].
15 U.S.C. § 3301(12) (Supp. III 1979). The NGPA places intrastate contracts which come under
the definition of a rollover contract under a ceiling price. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3316(b)-3316(c) (Supp. III
1979).
145. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
147. 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd in part, No. B-7979 (rex. Oct. 1, 1980),
vacated on rehearing, rev'd inpart, No. B-7979 (Tex. Feb. 4, 1981).
148. No. B-7979, slip op. at I (rex. Feb. 4, 1981). For the purpose of clarity, reference to
Exxon may also include reference to Sun Oil Co., the other producer involved in the market value
controversy in Middleton.
149. The parties stipulated that all of the gas from the leases was sold in intrastate commerce
during the years 1973-1975. d., slip op. at 12.
150. Id., slip op. at 10-I1.
151. The two market value provisions which controlled in Middleton, although contained in
two separate oil and gas leases, were identical in language. Id., slip op. at 2.
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of the amount realized from such sale."' 52 Exxon's gas plant was lo-
cated within the field of production, but outside the boundary lines of
the royalty owners' leased premises. During three consecutive years
which succeeded the escalation of natural gas prices in the 1970's, natu-
ral gas produced from the wells of the royalty owners was delivered by
Exxon from its gas plant and royalties were paid on a "field price"
basis. "'53 Ultimately alerted to the discrepancy between market value
royalties and "field price" royalties, the aggrieved royalty owners con-
solidated their claims in a single lawsuit.
154
The trial court heard testimony as to what gas sales were compa-
rable to the intrastate gas sales in question for the purpose of determin-
ing market value. Testimony offered by the royalty owners expert did
not limit comparable sales to the field of production. Instead, the ex-
pert defined TRC districts 2, 3 and 4 as the marketing area from which
comparable sales could be drawn. The districts effectively comprised
the Texas Gulf Coast producing area where gathering and transporting
facilities were present, and a majority of gas consumption occurred. "
The districts were interconnected through a complex intrastate and in-
terstate pipeline system. Many Gulf Coast gas contracts contained
price redetermination clauses which used these TRC districts as the
area from which to draw comparable sales.' 5 6 The expert reviewed
more than 30,000 intrastate gas sales transactions within the three TRC
districts. 57 From these sales transactions the expert averaged the three
highest prices of gas, adjusted to heating capacity, 58 during the first
month of each quarter of a year during the gas sales in question.' 59
152. The two proceeds provisions, in Middleton, although contained in two separate oil and
gas leases, were substantially similar. The other proceeds provision provided "that on gas so sold
at the wells the royalties shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale." Thus the
difference was merely the insertion of the word so between gas and sold. Id. (emphasis added).
153. The natural gas was sweet gas. Id.
154. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d at 354-55.
155. No. B-7979, slip op. at 14 & n.3 (Tex. Feb. 4, 1981).
156. Id. slip op. at 14. See note 86 supra.
157. In Texas, a gas pipeline purchaser is required each month to file a Purchaser's
Monthly Gas Tax Report with the State Comptroller of Public Accounts. These reports,
commonly called "Form 60-150's" contain the name of the purchaser and seller, the
month and year of each purchase; the lease and county from which the gas was pro-
duced; the quality of the gas or whether it is produced from an oil well or gas well; the
volume purchased; and the price. The [royalty owner's] expert. . . reviewed over 30,000
of these reports to arrive at an opinion of market value.
Id., slip op. at 11. A Purchaser's Monthly Gas Tax Report is filed for severance tax purposes.
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d at 356 n.2.
158. The heating capacity was measured by British Thermal Units. No. B-7979, slip op. at 14
(Tex. Feb. 4, 1981).
159. "[The royalty owner's expert] arrived at his opinion by taking the arithmetical average of
1981]
28
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss3/8
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Significantly, most gas purchasers established initial gas contract sales
prices and reestablished gas prices under re-determination clauses by
using the highest prices. 160 This practice naturally tended to skew an
expert's survey. The royalty owners also noted that after the initial
price increases precipitated by the energy shortage, Exxon used another
method of computation, which Exxon called the "new vintage gas"
concept, for determining the market value of gas discovered and pro-
duced after January 1, 1972.161 The trial court adopted the royalty
owners' expert's method for determining market value during the gas
sales in question. 16
2
The trial court also heard testimony from Exxon's expert witness
who testified as to the computation of Exxon's "field price." To com-
pute its "field price" Exxon reviewed reports filed by twenty-six major
pipeline purchasers in a marketing area consisting of TRC district 3
and seven adjoining counties. Exxon then totaled the sales transactions
for one month in each quarter of a year for gas currently delivered to
those twenty-six purchasers. Exxon divided this sum by the total vol-
ume of the gas delivered by the twenty-six purchasers to obtain a vol-
ume-weighted average price.' 63  Both the trial court and the civil
appeals court rejected Exxon's "field price" computation method on the
grounds that it was tantamount to the prevailing market value during
the intrastate gas sale in question."
The civil appeals court in Middleton affirmed in part and reversed
in part the trial court rulings. The civil appeals court affirmed the trial
court's holding that the word "sold" referred to the sale of gas on deliv-
ery and not at the time of execution of the controlling long-term gas
the three highest prices paid from quarter to quarter to any quantity of gas anywhere in the rele-
vant market area." Id., slip op. at 11.
160. Id., slip op. at 15.
161. Exxon treats gas discovered and produced after January 1, 1972, as new vintage gas
and computes the royalty of this gas in a manner completely different from its field price
.Market value for Exxon's new vintage gas is determined, by Exxon, by taking the
arithmetic average of the three highest prices paid by a pipeline for sales over one mil-
lion cubic feet per day, with adjustments [for heating capacity].
Id., slip op. at 16.
162. Id., slip op. at 12.
163. Exxon's expert. . . testified that Exxon's "field price" was the market value of the
gas. Exxon's "field price" for the. . .[field [of production] is computed from sales in
TRC #3 plus. . . seven adjoining counties. . . .The field price is calculated by taking
the total price paid for one month in each quarter for the gas currently delivered to all
major purchasers and dividing it by the total volume of gas delivered.
Id., slip op. at 12. In effect, this was Middleton's determination of the volume weighted average.
164. Id., slip op.
[Vol. 16:550
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contract. 165 The civil appeals court affirmed the trial court's rejection
of Exxon's "field price" as a basis from which royalties could be com-
puted because interstate sales were considered.' 66 The civil appeals
court reversed the trial court in holding that a sale of gas "off the prem-
ises" was not a sale. "at the well.' '167 Finally, the civil appeals court
reversed the trial court's acceptance of the royalty owners' expert testi-
mony as to the method for determining the prevailing market value
during the intrastate gas sales in question. 68 The Texas Supreme
Court granted review.
B. The Issues and Holdings in Middleton
The supreme court in Middleton first determined whether royalties
for gas "sold or used off the premises" should be calculated from mar-
ket value or proceeds. It was clear that for gas sold "at the well," the
royalties were to be calculated from proceeds. It was also clear that
"off the premises" meant off the leased premises.' 69 The question
presented was whether the boundary lines of the leased premises deter-
mined whether market value or proceeds royalties were to be paid by
Exxon. The supreme court looked to whether gas sold "off the prem-
ises" could still be sold "at the wells." The royalty owners argued that
the gas royalty clause provided for royalties based on "market value"
for all gas sold or used off the leased premises. The royalty owners also
argued that the royalty clause provided for royalties based on proceeds
for all gas sold "at the wells," or within the leased premises. The roy-
alty owners specifically argued that in the "market value" royalty pro-
visions, the phrase "off the premises" modified both "sold" and "used."
Therefore, it was asserted, because the market value royalty provision
referred to all gas sales off the premises, then the phrase "sold at the
wells" included all sales which occurred "on the premises." 170 Relying
largely on Butler,'7' Exxon argued that in the "market value" royalty
165. 571 S.W.2d at 357-56. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
166. 571 S.W.2d at 362.
167. No. B-7979, slip op. at 3 (Tex. Feb. 4, 1981).
168. 571 S.W.2d at 362.
169. No. B-7979, slip op. at 3-4 (Tex. Feb. 4, 1981).
170. Id., slip op. at 4.
171. Exxon relies heavily on Butler v. Exxon Corp. In Butler. . .the royalty clause is almost
identical to the one in issue. Gas produced from the Butler leases was sold off the leased premises,
but within the field of production. The trial court interpreted the phrase "sold at the wells" to
include sales which occurred anywhere in the vicinity of the field and found the gas sold from the
Butler leases was "sold at the wells." The Court of Civil Appeals expressly approved this finding.
It noted the parties did not use mutually exclusive terms such as "on the premises" and "off the
19811
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provision, the phrase "off the premises" modified only the word "used"
so that the phrase "sold at the wells" could be neither defined nor lim-
ited by the language in the lease. Accordingly then, a sale "at the well"
could include any sale within the field of production.17 2 The supreme
court looked to the entire gas royalty clause. The court gave heavy
consideration to the fact that Exxon's construction created overlaps be-
tween the requirements of the market value royalty provision and the
requirements of the proceeds royalty provision. 73 The supreme court
also compared the distances from the leased premises in Skaggs v.
Heard7 4 and Kingery v. Continental Oil Co. t7 The supreme court af-
firmed the civil appeals court decision by agreeing with the royalty
owners' argument that gas sold "off the premises" means gas which is
premises" or "at the well" and "away from the well," and that the clauses based on "amount
realized" from a sale "at the well" had no limiting language requiring the sale to be "on the
premises." The court relied primarily on expert testimony about what constituted a "sale at the
well" as understood in the oil and gas industry. Id., slip op. at 6-7. See p. 562 supra for the
royalty clause in Butler.
172. No. B-7979, slip op. at 4 (rex. Feb. 4, 1981).
173. Exxon's contention that the words "off the premises" modifies the word "used" and
not the world "sold" is weakened by looking at the entire clause.
... on gas. . sold or used off the premises
... the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used.
The words "so sold" imply the gas has been sold in a certain manner. In Webster's Third
International Dictionary, "so" is defined as "in a manner or was that is indicated or
suggested. If, as Exxon insists, "offthe premises" modifies the word "used" only, paral-
lel construction would rewrite the phrase to provide a royalty calculated on "the market
value at the well of one-eighth of the gas sold or so used."
Exxon's construction creates royalty standards which overlap. According to Exxon,
the market value standard applies to all sales wherever they occur, whereas, the amount
realized standard applied only to sales at the wells even though sales at the wells are
covered by the market value standard. Exxon's construction would cause the royalty
clause to read as follows:
On gas. . . produced from said land and sold. . . the market value at the well of
one-eighth of the gas so sold provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be
one-eighth of the amount realized.
We conclude "off the premises" modifies both "sold" and "used." The "premises"
is the land described in the lease agreement. Therefore, sold "off the premises" means
gas which is sold outside the leased premises. Thus, "sold at the wells" means sold at the
wells within the lease, and not sold at the wells within the fields.
Id., slip op. at 4-5 (emphasis in original)
174. 172 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Tex. 1959). "In Skaggs v. Heard... it was held, under a gas
royalty clause, that a sale at a separator on the leased premises, but 320 feet from the wellhead,
was a sale 'at the well' as opposed to being a sale not at the well and off the leased premises." No.
B-7979, slip op. at 7 (rex. Feb. 4, 1981). See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
175. 434 F. Supp. 349 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
[I]n Kingery v. Continental Oil Co... the [c]ourt, in construing a gas royalty provision
similar to the one in question, held that a sale off the premises was not a sale at the wells.
In that case the point of delivery was located off the premises approximately 3-1/2 miles
from nearest line of the leased premises.
No. B-7979, slip op. at 7 (rex. Feb. 4, 1981). See notes 104-09 supra and accompanying text.
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sold outside the leased premises.1 7 6  Moreover, the supreme court
found its conclusion to be consistent with its construction of the lan-
guage in the Vela lease.'77 Significantly, without reference to how far
Exxon's gas plant was from the lease premises, the supreme court stated
that "[t]o the extent the Civil Appeals' interpretation of the royalty
clause in Butler .. .conflicts with our interpretation of this [royalty]
clause, it is disapproved."'
' 78
The supreme court in Middleton then considered the issue of when
and how "market value" should be determined. It was undisputed that
"market value" is determined when the gas is sold. The question
presented was when the gas was "sold." In an attempt to show that the
civil appeals court erred in relying on Vela, Exxon argued that Vela
was distinguishable because, unlike the language in the present royalty
provisions, the language in Vela's royalty provisions evidenced the par-
ties intent that market value be determined when the gas is delivered to
a gas purchaser under a long-term gas contract. The supreme court
rejected this argument after construing the term "sold," and several
other royalty provision terms, to support the position that the original
parties to the lease in Middleton also intended "market value" to be
determined upon delivery.179 Exxon also argued that the financial real-
ities of the natural gas industry required that "sold" mean the time gas
176. Note 174 supra. See note 84 supra for language in the civil appeals court in Middleton
which the supreme court quoted and affirmed. No. B-7979, slip op. at 3 (rex. Feb. 4, 1981).
177. Our construction in no way conflicts with Texas Oil and Gas Corporation v. Vela
.... In Vela, the royalty clause obligated Texas Oil and Gas:
'To pay to lessor, as royalty for gas from each well where gas only is found, while
the same is being sold or used offthepremises, one-eighth of the market price at the
wells of the amount so sold or used. .. .'
Gas produced from the Vela leases was sold on the leased premises. The sole stan-
dard for calculating royalties was market value, regardless of where the sale took place.
Under those circumstances, the phrase "off the premises" did not modify sold, and the
words "so sold" as used in that context referred to all sales.
No. B-7979, slip op. at 5-6 (Tex. Feb. 4, 1981).
178. Id., slip op. at 7.
179. Under the express terms of the clause, for royalty to become payable, gas must be
'produced from said land and sold or used off the premises .... .' Production means
actual physical extraction of the mineral from the land. . . .Under the royalty clause,
production of gas is a prerequisite to its sale or use. The gas purchase contracts became
effective before the gas was produced and sold. The clause also employs the words 'sold'
and 'used' in the same tense. Gas is 'used' when delivered or consumed. The time gas is
'sold' is the same time gas is 'used'--when it is delivered. Because Exxon must pay
royalties based on market value for gas 'used off the premises,' that same royalty clause
cannot permit Exxon to pay royalties on 'gas sold off the premises' on any basis other
than its market value when delivered. The wording of the royalty clause, therefore, ne-
gates the idea of the sale of gas on the effective date of a gas contract for royalty pur-
poses. Just as gas was 'being sold' when delivered to the gas purchasers in Vela, so was
gas 'sold' when delivered by Exxon to its customer.
Id., slip op at 8-9 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original) (citing Monsanto Co. v. Tyrrel, 537
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became committed to a long-term gas contract.' 80 The supreme court
emphasized t1e distinction between Exxon's royalty obligation under a
lease and its obligation under a contract. Relying on Foster and Vela,
the supreme court noted that the burdensome obligation which Exxon
had incurred by negotiating gas purchase contracts presented no rea-
son to disregard the plain and unambiguous terms of a lease drafted by
Exxon and negotiated independently of the subsequent long-term gas
contracts.18 t Furthermore, the supreme court found Exxon's use of two
different computations from determining market value, the "field
price" computation, and the "new vintage gas" computation, inconsis-
tent with the determination that gas is "sold" when delivered. The
supreme court also perceived this practice to be inconsistent with the
determination of market value from a comparable sales measurement.
On this point, the supreme court emphasized that market value is not
dependent on when gas is discovered.' 82  In line with its decision in
Vela, the supreme court strictly construed the terms of the royalty pro-
visions and concluded that market value would be determined when
the gas was delivered under a long-term gas contract.
The supreme court then turned to determine how market value is
determined. The supreme court first defined "market value" by stating:
Market value is defined as the price property would bring
when it is offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obli-
gated to sell, and is bought by one who is under no necessity
S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976, writ ref n.r.e.)) (term "production," as found in an oil and
gas lease in question, meant the actual physical severance of the mineral from the soil).
180. No. B-7979 slip op. at 9 (Tex. Feb. 4, 1981) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
181. Exxon insists the practicalities of the natural gas industry require us to construe
'sold' to mean the time the gas becomes committed to a bona fide long-term gas contract.
We are not unmindful of the realities of the gas industry; however, our resolution of this
problem is based upon the recognition of two separate and distinct transactions, the lease
agreement and the gas contract. Although as between Exxon and its customer, the gas
may have been sold when the contracts became effective, there is no basis in the royalty
clause for applying such a definition to the lease agreements. Exxon's royalty obligations
are determined from lease agreements which were executed prior to and wholly in-
dependent of the gas contracts. When Exxon negotiated the gas contracts, it took the risk
that the revenue therefrom would be sufficient to satisfy its royalty obligations. That
subsequent increases in market value have made these obligations financially burden-
some is no reason to compel this Court in disregard the plain and unambiguous terms of
the royalty clause and rewrite it to conform to the meaning that Exxon, as drafter of the
language, says was intended. Exxon's royalty obligations are fixed and unaffected by its
gas contracts. If the parties intended royalties to be calculated on the amount realized
standard, they could and should have used only a 'proceeds-type' clause.
Id., slip op at 9-10. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The court in Middleton added that
"[tihe parties did not use 'market value' and 'amount realized,' interchangeably and we reject
Exxon's assertion that the parties intended 'market value' to have essentially the same meaning as
"amount realized." Id.
182. Id., slip op. at 17.
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of buying it. To determine the market value of gas, the gas
should be valued as though it is free and available for sale.
183
Relying on Vela, the supreme court observed that "[m]arket value may
be calculated by using comparable sales [which are] sales of gas...
comparable in time, quality, quantity, and availability to marketing
outlets."' 84 The supreme court determined that Vela's comparability
test would be used to implement a theoretical free market value defini-
tion. The supreme court then considered what sales were comparable
to the intrastate gas sales in question for the purpose of determining the
market value during the intrastate gas sales in question.
Middleton considered the civil appeals court's rejection of the ex-
pert testimony introduced by the royalty owners' as to the determina-
tion of the prevailing market value at the time of the relevant intrastate
gas sale. The supreme court also noted the fact that gas production, gas
gathering and transporting facilities, and gas consumption were present
within the three TRC districts. In addition, the court considered that
many Gulf Coast gas contracts contained price re-determination
clauses which used these three TRC districts as the relevant market
area. The trial court had held that the relevant marketing area, from
which comparable sales could be drawn, was the three TRC districts
considered by the royalty owners' experts. In reversing the trial court,
the civil appeals court had interpreted Vela to hold that the relevant
marketing area was the field of production. The supreme court, how-
ever, emphasized that the relevant marketing area was dependent upon
the facts of each market value controversy case. The supreme court
held that a marketing area existed when "within this area [there were]
sales comparable in time, quality, and availability of marketing out-
lets" 85 to the gas sale in question.
The supreme court in Middleton considered the expert testimony
introduced by the royalty owners' regarding which sales were compara-
183. No. B-7979, slip op. at 13 (Tex. Feb. 4, 1981) (citation omitted) (citing Polk County v.
Tenneco, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1977)).
184. Sales comparable in time occur when contracts executed contemporaneously with
the sale of the gas in question. Sales comparable in quality are those of similar physical
properties such as sweet, sour, or casinghead gas. Quality also involves the legal charac-
teristics of the gas; that is, whether it is sold in a regulated or unregulated market, or in
one particular category of a regulated market. Sales comparable in quantity are those of
similar volumes to the gas in question. To be comparable, the sales must be made from
an area with marketing outlets similar to the gas in question. Gas from fields with out-
lets to interstate markets only, for instance, would not be comparable to gas from field
with outlets only to the intrastate market.
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ble to the intrastate gas sale in question for the purpose of determining
market value during the time involved. From a qualitative perspective,
the supreme court agreed with the expert's conclusion that sweet gas
sales were comparable. 8 6 Moreover, the supreme court found that all
of the sales transactions had been adjusted according to the gas' heating
capacity. Legal quality was also considered. The supreme court found
it persuasive that only intrastate gas sales, not interstate gas sales, were
considered by the expert. 187 The supreme court also found persuasive
the expert's testimony that gas sales need not be quantitatively compa-
rable where the heating capacity of the gas is known. Consequently,
the supreme court ignored the element of quantitative comparability.188
The supreme court accepted the expert's testimony that the three TRC
districts were interconnected through a complex intrastate and inter-
state pipeline system. Consequently, the supreme court agreed with the
expert that gas within the three TRC districts was comparable to the
gas in question in availability to marketing outlets. Finally, the
supreme court agreed with the tri-monthly averaging by the expert of
the three highest prices in the three TRC districts since they repre-
sented the most current price in a rapidly escalating market. The court
also considered it significant that most gas purchasers determined gas
contract prices by using the highest gas prices. 18 9 The supreme court
found that the royalty owners' expert's testimony met the theoretical
free market value definition as determined by Vela's comparability test.
Exxon attempted to discredit the expert testimony proffered by the
royalty owners. Exxon argued that the royalty owners' expert had val-
ued the gas as if it were sold on a theoretical free market. Therefore,
Exxon argued, because the gas which Exxon sold was committed to
long-term contracts, then the expert's sales were incomparable. The
supreme court noted though, that a gas contract between Exxon and a
third party would not alter Exxon's duties under the lease. The
supreme court affirmed the trial court's valuation of the intrastate gas
sales in issue as if the gas were sold in a free market.' 90 The supreme
court also considered the argument that Exxon's "field price" was sy-
nonymous with the prevailing market value at the time of the gas sale.
186. Id., slip op. at 14. See note 153 supra.
187. No. B-7979, slip op. at 15 (rex. Feb. 4, 1981).
188. "[The royalty owner's expert] testified that if one knew the btu value of the gas and made
the necessary adjustments, that sales could be made comparable regardless of quantity." Id.
189. Id.
190. "We hold that the trial court did not err in valuing the gas as if it were free and available
for sale." Id., slip op. at 16.
[Vol. 16:550
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The supreme court acknowledged that the "field price" was admissible
as evidence. But the supreme court concluded that interstate and intra-
state gas prices were "conceptually and legally different."19' The court
buttressed this conclusion in emphasizing that Exxon's "new vintage
gas" concept was remarkably similar to the royalty owners' expert's
method for determining market value. 192
Finally, the supreme court in Middleton considered the civil ap-
peals court's requirement that a mathematical average of all gas prices
within a field of production be corroborated with comparable sales. In
Middleton the supreme court quoted its statement in Vela that a math-
ematical average of all prices paid in the field is "not a final answer to
the difficult problem of determining market value at any particular
time." 93 Vela's holding as to a mathematical average of all gas prices
was derived from expert testimony. Cognizant of this fact, the supreme
court cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in Weymouth in emphasizing:
The complexity of the oil and gas industry makes it difficult to
establish a formula to determine the market value of gas in
each field in Texas. The market value of gas may be estab-
lished by expert testimony. Once experts qualify, their testi-
mony is to be considered by the fact finder. Objections to the
basis of their testimony goes to its weight, not to its admissi-
bility.' 94
Middleton held that there was some evidence to support the trial court's
acceptance of the royalty owner's method for determining the prevail-
ing market value for the time period in question. The supreme court
affirmed both lower courts in holding that the word "sold" within a gas
royalty clause referred to the sale of gas at the time gas is delivered
under a long-term gas contract, and not at the time the long-term con-
191. Id. This was only dictum though, since the gas sale in question was only an intrastate gas
sale.
192. In fact, the formula used by Exxon for calculating royalties on new vintage gas is
remarkably similar to [the royalty owner's expert's] market value. Market value for Ex-
xon's new vintage gas is determined, by Exxon, by taking the arithmetic average of the
three highest prices paid by a pipeline for sales over one millions cubic feet per day.
Id., slip op. at 16.
193. Id., slip op. at 17.
194. This view is too restrictive for the situation of an expert witness explaining his opin-
ion. Lessors' heavy reliance on the Sartor cases would bind upon us and all experts the
rules applicable to introduction of direct evidence of comparable sales. This is simply
unrealistic where we deal with an expert who, once he establishes his qualifications and
he gives his broad, general opinion, needs to be able to reveal the basis for his opinion in
his own language without too many communication-crippling legal barriers thrown in
his way.
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tract is executed. The supreme court affirmed the civil appeals court
ruling that gas is sold "at the well" only when it is delivered inside the
boundary lines of the leased premises. Similar to the decision in Vela,
the supreme court in Middleton implemented a theoretical free market
value definition with a test requiring sales comparable in time, quality
and availability to marketing outlets for the purpose of computing mar-
ket value during the the intrastate gas sale in question. Significantly
though, the supreme court in Middleton rejected Vela insofar as it held
an averaging of all gas prices for gas sold in a field and production was
required. Middleton concluded in dictum that gas sold in intrastate and
interstate commerce was conceptually and legally different.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET VALUE CONTROVERSY IN
EXXON CoRp. v MIDDLETON
A. When Is a Sale "Offthe Premises?"
The supreme court in Middleton considered the major issues of the
market value controversy pertaining to the sale of intrastate gas, which
remains unregulated by the federal government. 95 The supreme court
considered the issue of whether Exxon's gas plant could be both "off
the premises" and "at the well." In Vela, the supreme court explicitly
set forth that what a royalty owner received in royalty payments was
strictly determined by the language of the controlling gas royalty
clause. Vela, though, did not consider the question of when gas is sold
off the leased premises. The market value-proceeds royalty clause,
which has been the source of vigorous litigation in market value con-
troversy cases, distinguishes the payment of market value royalties and
proceeds royalties on the basis of the delivery point at which the gas is
sold. The producer in Butler raised this distinction in successfully ar-
guing that distinguishing the gas royalty phrases "at the well" and "off
the premises" on the basis of the boundary lines of the leased premises
had no relation to the economic realities of a gas field of production
and should not be limited by such boundary lines but by the field of
production. Though the distance between Exxon's gas plant and the
boundary lines of the leased premises was not considered, the supreme
court did note the distances involved in the federal district court deci-
sions in Skaggs v. Heard and Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., where
boundary lines of the leased premises' were considered to be distinc-
195. See note 12 supra for mention of the supreme court's conclusions in Middleton which are
not dealt with in this casenote.
[Vol. 16:550
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tions, between the terms "at the well" and "off the premises." In inter-
preting gas royalty clause language almost identical to the language
interpreted by the civil appeals court in Butler, the Middleton court
emphasized that the obligation to pay market value royalties and pro-
ceeds royalties could not be overlapped. This result would occur if the
term "off the premises" were construed to modify only the word
"used". The effect would be that gas sold off the leased premises
would be treated as gas sold at the wells, thus creating the overlap.
General rules of construction dictated against the result. Furthermore,
the supreme court narrowly defined the gas royalty term "premises" to
mean leased premises. Consequently, the supreme court in Middleton
limited Butlery' "field of production" ruling in holding that gas sold
"off the premises" was not sold "at the well" and accordingly entitled
royalty owners to market value royalties. The ruling in Middleton
though, may be susceptible to the argument that if changed circum-
stances place the gas plant close enough to the boundary line of the
leased premises then the reasoning successfully advanced by the produ-
cer in Butler would apply. Specifically, the economic realties of the
situation would dominate consideration of whether a gas sale may be
both "at the well" and "off the premises" in interpreting controlling gas
royalty language and the result may concide with Butler.196 However,
royalty owners may alternatively argue that the supreme court pur-
posely avoided direct reference to distance in order to stress that the
boundary lines of leased premises strictly controlled this issue. In ef-
fect, the supreme court in Middleton narrowly construed the gas royalty
phrases "at the well" and "off the leased premises" against their drafter
while the civil appeals court in Butler, which was more sympathetic to
196. Professor John S. Lowe provides an argument against the the supreme court's rule in
Middleton with the following example:
Suppose ... that A Company leases from 0 under four separate but identical leases
containing the Middleton royalty formulation or similar languge, in sections 1, 2, 3, and
4 in a township. Suppose further, [that] the wells are drilled on each of the four sections
and that the gas from the wells is committed to sale under a single gas contract. Suppose
finally, that the gas pipeline at which deliveries are made angles in a southwesterly-
northeasterly direction across sections 2 and 3 so that the meters for the wells on leases
on 3 and 4 are set on lease 3 while the meters for the wells on leases I and 2 are set on
lease 2. If the gas contract provides, as is typical, that the ownership of the gas passes at
the meter, then under the Middleton decision, royalties on gas from the wells on sections
2 and 3 would be calculated on the basis of the amount realized by the lessee [producer]
under the terms of the gas contract, while royalties on the gas from the wells drilled on
sections I and 4 will be calculated on the basis of current market value when delivered.
Professor Lowe believes that this example points to the impracticality of the decision in Middleton
as to when gas is sold "at the well." Discussion with John S. Lowe, Professor of Law and Associ-
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the financial difficulties entailed in gas production, more liberally con-
strued almost identical gas royalty language.' 97
B. When is Market Value to be Determined?
The Texas Supreme Court in Middleton agreed with previous mar-
ket value controversy decisions on the issue of when gas is "sold." Pro-
ducers, though, may rely on the dissent in Vela which regards these
decisions as suspect for the reason that the lease in Foster expressly
provided for royalties on the basis of continuing sales while the more
common leases in Vela, and the Exxon cases, did not explicitly provide
for continuing sales. This argument urges that a gas sale occurs at the
time of delivery only where the controlling gas royalty clause contains
continuing sales language.'98 Moreover, because explicit continuing
sales language is not common to a market value-proceeds royalty
clause, such an argument also warrants that gas generally be consid-
ered "sold" not on a daily basis, but when the controlling long-term gas
contract is executed.' 99
One of the threshold problems in determining when gas is sold is
ascertaining the parties intent. Arguments can be advanced in support
of either position regarding when the parties perceived the gas as sold.
However, one essential point to remember, is that contractual obliga-
tions pertaining to gas contracts should not to be interposed with roy-
alty obligations imposed by the lease under Middleton. The two are
separate and distinct. Arguably, the royalty owner should not be pe-
nalized for the responsibility which the producer has assumed via his
long-term gas contracts. Middleton may also be consistent with Vela
and Foster in that, arguably, the financial realities of the oil and gas
industry do not affect the express obligations of a producer under a
controlling gas royalty clause. However, the supreme court's holding in
197. Note 67 supra. Contra, First Nat'l Bank In Weatherford, v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d
783, 786 (rex. Civ. App. 1980, writ pending).
198. If express language referring to continuing sales is a prerequisite to determining when gas
is sold, the market value royalty provision in a market value-proceeds gas royalty clause may be
nullified. In other words, suppose that at the execution of a long-term gas contract the price
agreed upon by the parties to the controlling lease was judicially determined to be the market
value prevailing at the execution of the gas contract. In such instance, even after a rise in market
value the producer can satisfy both the market value and proceeds provisions of a market value-
proceeds gas royalty clause by merely paying proceeds royalties because the proceeds equals the
prevailing market value at the execution of the long-term gas contract.
Furthermore, the Texas' four-year statute of limitations may prevent any liability by the pro.
ducer for insufficient royalty payments. See note II supra.
199. A producer's chances of having such a definition judicially enforced will be enhanced
where that producer meets its implied obligation to market. See note 9 supra.
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Middleton may not be consistent with the customary acquiesecence by
royalty owners to the payments of proceeds royalties where controlling
gas royalty clauses required that market value royalties be paid. More-
over, the supreme court's ruling may be inconsistent with the royalty
owners' knowledge that gas could not be sold on a daily basis but had
to be sold under long-term gas contracts. Regardless of potential flaws
in Vela as noted by the dissenters therein, it appears to be well estab-
lished in Texas and the Fifth Circuit that gas is "sold" when delivered;
no court in these jurisdictions has held gas to be "sold" when a long-
term gas contract is executed. The Louisiana federal district court in
Domatti is also in accord with this view. In the execution of new oil
and gas leases, producers may escape the ruling that gas is "sold" when
delivered by defining "sold" to mean a sale at the execution of a subse-
quent controlling gas contract.2"
C. Determining Market Value
1. The Definition of Market Value to be Applied
Generally speaking, two basic definitions of market value have
been applied for determining the market value of a gas sale in a market
value controversy. These definitions are dependent upon the legal
quality of the gas sale in question. Where a gas sale involves only in-
trastate gas, market value has only been defined as the theoretical free
market value of gas sold. The supreme court in Middleton and the Ex-
xon cases accepted this position. Though Vela did not expressly define
market value, it arguably implied that the supreme court applied a the-
oretical market value because the court considered only unregulated
intrastate gas sales. In the Fifth Circuit, where an interstate gas sale
has been involved in a market value controversy case, market value is
commonly defined by Weymouth's regulated market value definition.
However, in the state court decision in Lightcap, the market value for
an interstate gas sale in question has been defined by the theoretical
free market value. Therefore, until the opinions of the federal district
court in Domatti and the Fifth Circuit in Kingery, producers were faced
with the possibility that Lightcap's reasoning would be found persua-
200. If, for instance, Lighlcap's ruling is rejected by the Texas Supreme Court, royalty owners
in Kansas, and possibly Montana, will still be able to collect theoretical free market value royalties
from gas sold in a price regulated market. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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sive by a court adjudicating a market value controversy case involving
interstate gas sales.
Lightcap's definition of a theoretical free market value was derived
from the Kansas Supreme Court's interpretation of Huber. The
supreme court had interpreted Huber to mean that a market value roy-
alty provision on its face required the theoretical free market value.
This reasoning in Lightcap has been circumvented by the court in Do-
matti where the producers successfully argued that Mobil Oil's "fair
presumption" dictum required that Weymouth's regulated market
value definition be applied. Moreover, the court in Domatti stated that
Weymouth merely defined the relevant market which its companion
case, Huber, had said the parties intended at the execution of the con-
trolling lease.2 1' Furthermore, the court in Domatti found it persuasive
201. Contra, First Nat'l Bank In Weatherford v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980, Writ pending). In Weatheiford, producer Exxon paid proceeds royalties, which was com-
puted from the amount received from the gas sales in question under a long-term gas contract
executed in 1967. The natural gas was irrevocably committed to interstate commerce. Conse-
quently, the proceeds royalties were computed from the federal price ceiling established over the
interstate gas market. The leases, executed in 1960, did not contain a market value-proceeds roy-
alty provision; the gas royalty clause did not obligate the producer to pay market value royalties or
proceeds royalties depending upon whether the gas was sold on or off the leased premises. In-
stead, the controlling gas royalty clauses obligated the producer to pay to the royalty owner "the
value of all oil and gas produced and saved from said leased premises." Id. at 785. The same
expert who had testified for the royalty owners in Middleton also testified in Weatherford to basi-
cally the same method for determining market value. Exxon's expert used four comparable sales
and arrived at a weighted average. Id. at 788 (dissenting opinion).
The civil appeals court in Weatherford rejected the royalty owner's expert's testimony that
intrastate gas sales were comparable to the interstate gas sales in question. The civil appeals court
in Weatherford stated: "The sale of this [interstate] gas was restricted and its marketability
thereby affected; it could not be sold in the intrastate market so its value in that market was zero.
Id. at 786 (citing Phillips Petro Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1944)). Furthermore,
in accord with Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978), the civil appeals court
in Weatherford found that "[i]n the field of eminent domain, where, as here, comparables are used
to determine market value, Texas law excludes evidence of sales of unrestricted property as com-
parable in finding the value of property which is burdened with restrictiveness." 597 S.W.2d 786
(citing City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 267 S.W.2d 808, 815 (Tex. 1954)). The civil appeals court
found this rationale to be consistent with the federal district court decisions in Brent and Remus.
See note 101 supra. Citing Vela, the civil appeals court noted that the royalty owner's claim for
market value royalties was premised on gas sold when run on a daily basis. The court noted that
this claim failed on the basis of insufficient evidence. Finally, the civil appeals court excluded the
relevance of Vela as to Weatherford, by emphasizing that Vela had not involved regulated gas
sales. Consequently, even Vela'r comparability test was excluded from consideration. Id. at 786.
Not suprisingly, the civil appeals court in Weatherford rejected all evidence that there were sales
comparable to the regulated sales in question. The trial court in Weatherford held:
The only gas sales which may be comparable to to the sale involved in this case are sales
to the interstate market of gas of the same vintage as the gas involved in this case made
by a similar producer. All other sales, and specifically intrastate sales, are not compara-
ble to the sale involved in this case and are therefore not relevant to the market price of
the gas involved in this case.
Id. at 789 (dissenting opinion). The civil appeals court in Weatherford affirmed the trial court's
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that Lightcap never reached the question of market value so that the
definition it applied was was only dictum. The Fifth Circuit in Kingery
has also afforded producers an argument to circumvent Lightcap's rea-
soning. Kingery accepted the Supreme Court's dictum in Southland
that even where a lease has been executed before the decision in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, let alone the enactment of the NGA, the
royalty owners must accept royalties based upon Weymouth's regulated
market value definition. If the reasoning in Lightcap as to the defini-
tion to be applied can be effectively countered the definition of market
value to be applied in a market value controversy case will certainly
depend upon the legal quality of the gas in question. Consequently,
where the gas sale in question is unregulated, the definition would be a
theoretical free market value definition; where the gas sale in question
is regulated, the definition would be a regulated market value defini-
tion similar to Weymouth's definition of market value. This is signifi-
cant because the definition of market value affects the scope of the test
with which the definition is implemented.
2. Determining Comparable Sales
Since the Texas Supreme Court decision in Vela, the well-estab-
lished test for determining the theoretical or regulated market value of
gas sold has been by sales comparable in time, quality and availability
to marketing outlets. Vela's comparability test has been accepted by all
ruling. Id. at 787. The dissent emphasized that where the royalty owner had no control over the
sale of gas by a producer and knew nothing of a sale until after execution of the gas sales contract,
then the lease became, by the majority's ruling, a unilateral agreement subject to the execution of
a gas sales contract. Vela, Lightcap and the federal district court decision in Kingery were gener-
ally cited and relied upon.
The civil appeals court's statement in Middleton that Vela's comparability test would not be
used in a regulated market is consistent with the majority opinion in Weatherford. Significantly,
the supreme court and civil appeals court in Middleton both distinguished, in dictum, gas sold in
intrastate and interstate commerce. The supreme court went further by stating that gas sold in
intrastate and interstate commerce were "conceptually and legally different." Consequently, it
appears that where a pre-NGPA interstate gas sale is at issue in a market value controversy case,
courts may not apply Vela's comparability test but instead might equate market value with pro-
ceeds. Presumably market value and proceeds would be theoretically synonymous in the absence
of Yela's comparability test, at least where regulated gas is concerned. Where an NGPA regulated
gas sale is in question, the possibility of excluding Vela's comparability test is probably greater. In
this case, all gas sold in both interstate and intrastate commerce would be regulated.
The Weatherford decision was also contrary to those decisions which have considered the
issue of when gas is "sold" by holding that the gas was sold when the controlling long-term gas
contract was executed. However, this reasoning is consistent with the position that market value
and proceeds are theoretically the same. In short, Weatherford may be construed as supporting
the position that market value and proceeds are theoretically equal where a Federally regulated
gas sale is in question in a market value controversy case.
1981]
42
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss3/8
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
courts which have been faced with an issue of market value determina-
tion in a market value controversy. Comparable sales must be drawn
from the same marketing area. Middleton stated the corollary that a
marketing area exists when comparable sales may be drawn from it.
This ruling has extended the supreme court's dictum statement in Vela
that the field of production is not the final answer to the definition of
the marketing area. Unlike dictum in Butler that the field of produc-
tion would almost conclusively be the marketing area, Middleton has
potentially provided the most expansive holding to date in the Texas
state court system concerning the definition of the marketing area. Ar-
guably, by the supreme court's definition, there need only be a market-
ing area from which comparable sales may be drawn. Therefore, a
producer is not restricted to the field of production in determining com-
parable sales. In accord with Middle/on, a producer need only provide
an area with gathering and transporting facilities for gas produced.
Furthermore, the use of a marketing area which other producers also
use will be persuasive. The producer may arguably use one field of
production for several other gas fields as long as sales are comparable.
Moreover, the marketing area need not be another field of production
but only a portion of one possibly defined by county lines or TRC dis-
trict boundaries.
The Fifth Circuit's definition of marketing area has not reached
the limits of the supreme court in Middleton. Arguably the Fifth Cir-
cuit has impliedly overruled the "immediate vicinity" definition for
marketing area arrived at by the federal district court in Kingery. This
may have been accomplished when the Fifth Circuit held that regu-
lated market value was synonymous with the FPC ceiling rate. More-
over, in upholding Brent, Kingery may have determined that the
geographical areas over which FERC ceiling rates are set is the market-
ing area from which comparable sales will be drawn when FERC price
regulated gas sales are involved. Nevertheless, the Middle/on decision
may be highly persuasive since there appears to be no well-established
definition of a marketing area in the federal courts.
3. Application of Vela's Comparability Test
The supreme court in Middle/on provided the most complete anal-
ysis of Vela's comparability test to date. The Middle/on court held that
the market value of an intrastate gas sale in a market value controversy
case should be determined from sales comparable in time, quality,
[Vol. 16:550
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quantity, and availability to marketing outlets.2 ° 2 In effect, the court in
Vela merely recited the comparability test and stated that the gas sales
accepted by the trial court as comparable met that test. Relatively little
analysis was involved in Vela. This lack of analysis has been prevalent
in market value controversy cases which have invoked Vela's compara-
bility test. The exception to this lack of analysis has been the courts'
special concern for the legal quality of the gas in question. Unlike the
other elements of comparability in Vela's test, there has been a great
disparity between prices paid for natural gas depending upon the legal
quality of such gas. Whether the gas in question in a market value
controversy case has been sold in interstate or intrastate commerce has
determined its legal quality because of the effect of the NGA on inter-
state gas sales prices. In Vela, the court stated that the contract sales
price was not necessarily the market value. Recognizing the position
that the value of gas is zero on a market in which it cannot be sold, the
federal district court in Domatti, and the Fifth Circuit in Kingery have
basically rejected the argument that the parties intended that both in-
terstate and intrastate gas prices be included in computing market
value for an interstate gas sale in question. The fact that the parties
knew that gas sold in interstate commerce might be subject to restric-
tions has been expressed in Southland Royalty Co. The courts in Do-
matti and Kingery have consequently concluded that only interstate
gas is comparable to an interstate gas sale in question.203 Conse-
202. Only the comparability element of legal quality was vigorously contested in Middleton.
In considering physical quality, the supreme court basically stated that gas need have only the
same lack of impurities and same heating capacity in order to be physically comparable. The
court found persuasive that knowledge of a gas' heating capacity rendered the new element of
quantitative comparability useless. The supreme court found persuasive that the marketing area
was interconnected through a complex intrastate and interstate pipeline system. A more com-
monly contested issue has concerned the element of time. The controversy over this element has
revolved around the use of tri-monthly price data or monthly price data. Butler, and the civil
appeals court in Middleton, found persuasive the fact that monthly price data was more in line
with the daily sales of the gas industry. But the supreme court in Middleton has, in effect, recog-
nized the practicality of using tri-monthly price data since the Texas State Comptroller's Office
only processes PMG reports on a tri-monthly rate. Though these elements are considered in de-
termining comparable sales, legal quality has been the most significant element in the determina-
tion of comparable sales.
203. It is significant that the supreme court in Middleton completely disregarded, as legally
binding, the rules in Vela which were based on expert testimony. The supreme court in Vea had
held that a volume-weighted average of all gas prices in the field of production was the mathemat-
ical formula to be applied in determining the market value of the gas sales in question. The
supreme court in Middleton rejected the volume-weighted average formula. However, the
supreme court in Middleton neither overturned nor applied Ve/a's holding. This result is attribu-
table to the fact that a market value controversy outcome is highly dependent upon the peculiari-
ties of each case. The realities of the gas industry practically necessitate the use of expert
testimony. Therefore, objections to the basis of an expert's testimony goes to its weight, but not its
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quently, market value has been equated with proceeds as a practical
effect of these rulings. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's holding in
Pennzoil is consistent with the equating of market value with proceeds,
or the FERC ceiling rate, where individualized relief is available from
the FERC.2° Significantly, however, market value and proceeds re-
main theoretically different concepts in the market value contro-
versy.2°5 Although dictum, the supreme court in Middleton has
nevertheless stated that intrastate gas is conceptually and legally distin-
guishable from interstate gas. Quite possibly, if Middle/on's dictum is
any indication, the Texas state courts will follow the results in Kingery
and in Doma/ti, where royalty owners attempt to compare unregulated
intrastate gas sales with an interstate gas sale in question in a market
value controversy.
4. Determining Market Value from the Mathematical
Computation of Comparable Gas Sales Prices
Once comparable sales are determined, the issue to be considered
has been the mathematical method for computing the theoretical free
market value of the gas sales in question in a market value controversy
from the comparable gas sales. Before the energy shortage, a volume-
weighted averaging, as applied in Vela, was appropriate because the
disparity between market value and proceeds which later developed
did not exist.2"6 The civil appeals courts in Middleton and Jefferson
Land Co. agreed with Vela in using a volume-weighted average of all
gas prices paid in a field by excluding gas sales before the energy
shortage in order to prevent a depression of the judicially determined
theoretical free market value for the intrastate gas sold. The supreme
court in Middleton found it persuasive that the averaging of the three
highest prices in a marketing area was necessary in order for a judi-
admissibility. The supreme court in Vela agreed with this position. Furthermore, even testimony
which includes consideration of interstate sales may be admissible as evidence. But see note 203
supra. The supreme court in Middleton recognized that, in effect, the fact finder was the judge.
The supreme court cited Weymouth in support of this position. This rule appears to be well-
established in both the Texas judicial system and the Fifth Circuit. In short, while Vela's compa-
rability test is a rule of law to be followed by the Texas judicial system and the Fifth Circuit,
where Texas law is to be applied to a market value controversy, the factual conclusions of law
reached under Vela's comparability test, including those reached by the supreme court in Middle.
ton, are not rules of law.
204. But see note 201 supra.
205. See Comment, Vela: Legacy of Conflict Over Determination ofMarket aluefor Royalties
on Interstate andInterstate Gas and Continued Controversy with the Natural Gas PolicyAct of 1978,
11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 502, 524-32 (1979).
206. See note 103 supra.
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cially determined market value to represent the escalating theoretical
free market value of the intrastate gas sales in question. Consequently,
though the volume-weighted averaging in Middleton was overruled, the
supreme court might arguably consider a qualification to a volume-
weighted average persuasive, such as that made in Jefferson Land Co.
which allows such an average to represent the escalating theoretical
market free value of of a gas sale in question. In short, a mathematical
method which computes the escalating free market value of a gas sale
in question from comparable gas sales prices will be accepted.
D. The Effect of the NGPA
A market value controversy case concerning royalties paid for in-
terstate gas sales has not been ultimately resolved in a state judicial
system. But with the enactment of the NGPA has come the inevitabil-
ity that a state judicial system will be confronted with a market value
controversy case concerning royalties paid for federally regulated intra-
state gas sales. Generally speaking, the NGPA has made gas sold in
intrastate and interstate commerce legally comparable under Vela's
comparability test in a congressional effort to abolish the great dispar-
ity between market value for unregulated intrastate gas sold and the
federal ceiling rates under the NGA. Consequently, the differences in
legal quality, which was premised upon the difference between a mar-
ket value measurement, and a proceeds measurement which was lim-
ited by a suppressed ceiling rate, have conceivably been abolished until
1985. The courts in Domatti and Kingery qualified their comparison of
market value and proceeds by emphasizing that gas sold in interstate
and intrastate commerce were legally different and, therefore, market
value and proceeds were only equated as a practical result of their rul-
ings and not as a theoretical result. Arguably, the NGPA has made
FERC ceiling rates and market value equal so that the comparability
element, or legal quality, in Vela's test which has been so vigorously
contested by producers and royalty owners is, practically speaking, no
longer a contestable issue. Consequently, Vela's comparability test
may be of no use where the FERC ceiling price for a NGPA regulated
gas sale in a market value controversy case is theoretically the market
value of that gas until 1985. Significantly, however, the supreme court
in Middleton has found not only a legal, but a conceptual, difference
between gas sold in interstate and intrastate commerce. Even assuming
that the NGPA does decrease the great price disparity between market
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value and federally regulated proceeds, arguably the NGPA regulated
intrastate gas sales remain conceptually different for the reason that the
NGPA regulated interstate gas will remain irrevocably committed to
interstate commerce in 1985 when the gas sold in intrastate commerce
will be largely deregulated. Therefore, applying the reasoning in Light-
cap, where market value was found to be higher than the federal price
ceiling for the interstate gas there in question, and Vela's comparability
test, royalty owners could argue that market value is not theoretically
equal to the FERC ceiling price over the gas sale in question but is
equal to the prevailing market value of, at least, conceptually compara-
ble sales during the sale in question. The prevailing market value may
be at most the highest FERC ceiling rate for the reason that all gas
sales are regulated under the NGPA until 1985. Nonetheless, it must
be emphasized that the NGPA deflates the main reason for the use of
Vela's comparability test: price disparity.
V. CONCLUSION
Ostensibly, the NGPA will deregulate in 1985. Gas formerly sold
in unregulated intrastate commerce will be largely deregulated. Conse-
quently, gas will be sold in interstate commerce and intrastate com-
merce similarly to the way gas was sold after Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin but before the enactment of the NGPA. Perhaps in 1985 the
purpose of the NGPA will have been accomplished: the amelioration
of the price disparity between the market value of gas sold in the unreg-
ulated intrastate commerce and federally controlled interstate sales
under long-term gas contracts. Nonetheless, producers should plan for
the prevention of market value controversy cases. There is one basic
solution for producers-avoid the market value-proceeds royalty
clause. Avoiding this clause will not change the meaning of "sold" un-
less "sold" is defined in the lease to mean the time of the execution of a
subsequent controlling gas contract. But it will eliminate the question
of when gas is "sold off the premises." It will eliminate the payment of
market value royalties where only a proceeds royalty provision is
placed in a gas royalty clause. But if a market value provision is to be
used, then market value must at least be defined within the lease as the
federally regulated ceiling rate where the royalty owner's gas is sold in
interstate commerce. Considering the economic realities of the gas in-
dustry, and the burdensome obligations of a producer which have re-
sulted under the express language of market value-proceeds royalty
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provisions, the gas royalty provisions should be less strictly construed
against the producers.0 7 In any case, producers must not hide behind
the short-lived pricing scheme of the NGPA but must execute and
amend their leases as if the NGPA were not in force.
Steven L. Holcombe
207. See note 73 supra. Furthermore, even where such provisions are less strictly construed,
royalty owners are no less protected where the producer has breached an implied covenant to
market. See note 9 supra.
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